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Meeting Boumediene’s Challenge: The Emergence 
of an Effective Habeas Jurisprudence and 
Obsolescence of New Detention Legislation 
Nathaniel H. Nesbitt∗ 
In October 2001, a Kuwaiti aviation engineer named Fouad 
Al Rabiah traveled to Afghanistan to investigate the country’s 
refugee and medical infrastructure problems during the U.S. 
and United Kingdom bombardment.1 Unable to cross Afghani-
stan’s border with Iran, which had been sealed, Al Rabiah em-
barked on the lengthy overland journey through central Af-
ghanistan to exit the country via Pakistan.2 Meanwhile, in mid-
November, Osama bin Laden marshaled his forces around Jala-
labad, and moved into the Tora Bora Mountains to make a final 
stand against U.S. troops before the onset of winter.3 Just days 
after the ensuing battle, villagers on the outskirts of Jalalabad 
captured Al Rabiah and turned him over to U.S. forces, which 
eventually transferred him to the military prison at Guantá-
namo Bay.4 Interrogators abused Al Rabiah, and coerced him 
into making a series of false confessions.5 He did so in hopes of 
winning release to his wife and four children in Kuwait.6  
In September 2009, a federal judge in Washington, D.C. 
found this narrative more congruent with the evidence than the 
U.S. government’s version, and granted Al Rabiah’s petition for 
a writ of habeas corpus—a judicial determination that the Pres-
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 1. Al Rabiah v. United States, 658 F. Supp. 2d 11, 20–21 (D.D.C. 2009).  
 2. Id. at 21. 
 3. Id. at 41. 
 4. Id. at 28–34. 
 5. Id. 
 6. See id. at 32. 
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ident has no legal basis to detain him.7 Al Rabiah is one of thir-
ty-eight detainees to have won their habeas cases since the Su-
preme Court held in June 2008 that Guantánamo Bay de-
tainees can challenge their detention in federal court.8 
Although Boumediene opened the federal courthouse doors to 
Guantánamo detainees, it offered scant guidance as to how 
courts should adjudicate such cases.9 Since that time, federal 
judges have decided some fifty-three of more than one hundred 
pending habeas petitions.10 With minimal guidance from the 
Supreme Court and Congress, the federal courts in the District 
of Columbia have functioned, in effect, as a national security 
court, evaluating sensitive evidence and developing their own 
guidelines as to what constitutes lawful detention.  
Boumediene has been the subject of fierce and wide-
ranging criticism.11 While many, perhaps most, legal commen-
tators praise Boumediene as a victory for individual rights,12 
critics argue that the habeas process it approved raises grave 
 
 7. Id. at 42.  
 8. Boumediene v. Bush (Boumediene I), 553 U.S. 723, 732 (2008); see also 
Guantanamo Bay Habeas Decision Scorecard, CENTER CONST. RIGHTS, http:// 
ccrjustice.org/learn-more/faqs/guantanamo-bay-habeas-decision-scorecard (last 
visited Oct. 19, 2010) [hereinafter Habeas Scorecard] (listing decided Guantá-
namo cases); Andy Worthington, Guantánamo Habeas Results: The Definitive 
List, ANDY WORTHINGTON, http://www.andyworthington.co.uk/guantanamo 
-habeas-results-the-definitive-list (last visited Oct. 19, 2010) [hereinafter Ha-
beas Results] (same). 
 9. See Boumediene I, 553 U.S. at 780, 783–84, 786–87; see also id. at 801 
(Roberts, C.J., dissenting) (arguing that the decision in Boumediene “merely 
replaces a review system designed by the people’s representatives with a set of 
shapeless procedures to be defined by federal courts at some future date”). 
 10. See supra note 8. 
 11. E.g., GLENN SULMASY, THE NATIONAL SECURITY COURT SYSTEM: A 
NATURAL EVOLUTION OF JUSTICE IN AN AGE OF TERROR 130 (2009) (highlight-
ing the increased expenditure of government resources Boumediene required); 
Editorial, President Kennedy, WALL ST. J., June 13, 2008, at A14 (predicting 
the extension of Boumediene to confer other constitutional rights on alleged 
terrorists); John Yoo, The Supreme Court Goes to War, WALL ST. J., June 17, 
2008, at A23 (“[J]udicial micromanagement will now intrude into the conduct 
of war.”). Principal among Boumediene’s critics were the four dissenting mem-
bers of the Court. E.g., Boumediene I, 553 U.S. at 801 (Roberts, C.J., dissent-
ing); id. at 828 (Scalia, J., dissenting) (“[The Court’s decision] will almost cer-
tainly cause more Americans to be killed.”). 
 12. See, e.g., David D. Cole, Rights Over Borders: Transnational Constitu-
tionalism and Guantanamo Bay, 2007–2008 CATO SUP. CT. REV. 47, 47, 50–52; 
Ronald Dworkin, Why It Was a Great Victory, N.Y. REV. BOOKS, Aug. 14, 2008, 
at 18, 20. 
  
246 MINNESOTA LAW REVIEW [95:244 
 
concerns about the maintenance of U.S. national security.13 
Others worry that the paucity of clear standards may disad-
vantage detainees.14 In the wake of Boumediene, some legisla-
tors, judges, and academics have called on Congress to revisit 
Guantánamo detention policy, and pass legislation to provide 
uniform guidance to the courts.15 After more than two years of 
lower-court wrangling with the implications of Boumediene, 
these criticisms need not be assessed in the abstract: this Note 
comprehensively reviews the habeas cases decided since Bou-
mediene with a view to answering these questions and assess-
ing the wisdom of further detention legislation.  
The story is complex. In the first eighteen months of litiga-
tion, murky Supreme Court precedent gave rise to significant 
differences in the standards employed among district court 
judges adjudicating habeas cases. This state of affairs was bad 
for detainees because, in at least some cases, they were subject 
to different standards in different courtrooms. It was bad for 
the executive branch because the divergences had resulted, in 
part, from judges adopting less deferential stances on both 
substantive and procedural issues. It was bad for our justice 
system because it offended the bedrock principle of “uniform 
general treatment of similarly situated persons” that is “the es-
sence of law itself.”16 These early months of litigation suggested 
a dramatic, if commonsensical, solution: that the political 
 
 13. See, e.g., SULMASY, supra note 11, at 133; Yoo, supra note 11; Jack 
Goldsmith, Long-Term Terrorist Detention and Our National Security Court 
7–8 (Feb. 4, 2009), available at http://www.brookings.edu/~/media/Files/rc/ 
papers/2009/0209_detention_goldsmith/0209_detention_goldsmith.pdf. See gener-
ally Robert Chesney & Jack Goldsmith, Terrorism and the Convergence of Crim-
inal and Military Detention Models, 60 STAN. L. REV. 1079, 1087–89, 1097–98 
(2008) (detailing differences in procedural standards between criminal and mili-
tary detention systems). 
 14. See Chisun Lee, Op-Ed., Their Own Private Guantanamo, N.Y. TIMES, 
July 23, 2009, at A31. 
 15. Al-Bihani v. Obama, 590 F.3d 866, 881 (D.C. Cir. 2010) (Brown, J., 
concurring); Transcript of Hearing at 5–6, Anam v. Obama, 696 F.Supp. 2d 1, 
(D.D.C. 2010) (No. 04-1194), cited in BENJAMIN WITTES ET AL., THE EMERGING 
LAW OF DETENTION: THE GUANTÁNAMO HABEAS CASES AS LAWMAKING 6 
(Brookings Inst. 2010) [hereinafter HABEAS LAWMAKING]; Benjamin Wittes & 
Jack Goldsmith, Editorial, A Role Judges Should Not Have to Play, WASH. 
POST, Dec. 22, 2009, at A19; Benjamin Wittes & Jack Goldsmith, Editorial, 
Will Obama Follow Bush or FDR?, WASH. POST, June 29, 2009, at A17 [here-
inafter Wittes & Goldsmith, Will Obama Follow Bush or FDR?]; Josh Gers-
tein, Lindsey Graham Quietly Files Habeas Bill, POLITICO (Aug. 12, 2010, 7:58 
AM), http://www.politico.com/news/stories/0810/40968.html. 
 16. BMW of N. Am., Inc. v. Gore, 517 U.S. 559, 587 (1996) (Breyer, J., 
concurring). 
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branches pass new detention legislation designed to resolve the 
most serious of these problems and to ensure that every detain-
ee is held to the same standard.  
But the pragmatic case for new detention legislation will 
no longer write. The D.C. Circuit has stepped in to answer 
many of the lingering questions that plagued the early months 
of habeas litigation. Unequal application of the law is now sig-
nificantly less likely. Moreover, the D.C. Circuit’s opinions al-
most uniformly favor the government, and thus undermine the 
key motivation for Congress to pass new detention legislation—
namely, the maintenance of national security. Still, detainees 
are the biggest beneficiaries of the habeas litigation: so far 
judges have sided with thirty-eight of fifty-three of them, a re-
markable seventy-one percent success rate for detainees.17 In 
short, more than two years after the Supreme Court handed 
the reins of executive detention to federal judges in Washing-
ton, D.C., it is increasingly clear that the habeas process ap-
propriately balances U.S. national security and detainee liberty 
concerns. Through a critical examination of how the jurispru-
dence has unfolded, this Note tells the story of how and why 
habeas works. It concludes that new detention legislation 
would be unnecessary and counterproductive; rather, the most 
prudent approach is to allow the D.C. Circuit to continue to re-
solve disagreements among lower court judges as they arise.  
Part I reviews the legislation and precedent leading up to 
the current process of habeas review. Part II analyzes the dis-
trict court and D.C. Circuit opinions, paying particular atten-
tion to uniformity (or lack thereof) among district court judges 
and to their approaches to balancing national security and lib-
erty concerns. While the early state of the law benefitted nei-
ther the government nor detainees as a whole, the jurispru-
dence has matured remarkably quickly. Most foundational 
disagreements among judges have now been resolved, and have 
been resolved in a manner that should allay congressional con-
cerns about national security. Part III argues that while new 
detention legislation would have made sense during the first 
eighteen months of habeas litigation, the maturation of the ju-
risprudence has rendered this option unnecessary at best and 
 
 17. Habeas Results, supra note 8; see also Habeas Scorecard, supra note 8. 
The success rate is somewhat lower if one controls for the seventeen Uigher 
detainees, whose cases were technically decided under the provision of the De-
tainee Treatment Act of 2005 that Boumediene struck down as constitutionally 
insufficient. See Habeas Results, supra note 8. 
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counterproductive at worst. Habeas works. Congress should 
stand back and allow the courts to proceed. 
I.  THE ROAD TO HABEAS AND THE SCOPE OF 
EXECUTIVE DETENTION   
The military prison at Guantánamo Bay has held approx-
imately 779 alleged terrorists since the United States attacked 
Afghanistan in response to the attacks of September 11, 2001.18 
In the dragnet that followed 9/11, United States and allied 
forces captured scores of suspected terrorists—on the battle-
field in Afghanistan and as far away as Bosnia, Morocco, and 
Chicago.19 Viewing the very extension of judicial process to al-
leged terrorists as a national security threat, Bush Administra-
tion lawyers selected the military base at Guantánamo be-
cause, they thought, it was beyond the reach of the law.20 
Publicly contending that Guantánamo housed the “worst of 
the worst,”21 the Bush Administration’s initial position was 
that it could detain indefinitely without charge anyone it 
deemed an “enemy combatant” and subject him to trial by mili-
tary commission.22 In making this determination, Bush relied 
 
 18. Habeas Results, supra note 8. 
 19. Al Qaeda Arrests Worldwide, FOXNEWS.COM, Nov. 22, 2002, http:// 
www.foxnews.com/printer_friendly_story/0,3566,64199,00.html; see also David 
Cole, Out of the Shadows: Preventive Detention, Suspected Terrorists, and War, 
97 CALIF. L. REV. 693, 725–26 (2009) (arguing that the term “enemy comba-
tant” encompasses a wide range of people). 
 20. JOHN YOO, WAR BY OTHER MEANS: AN INSIDER’S ACCOUNT OF THE 
WAR ON TERROR 142–43 (2006) (discussing the selection of Guantánamo to 
house alleged terrorists); see also U.S. DEP’T OF DEF., THE NATIONAL DEFENSE 
STRATEGY OF THE UNITED STATES OF AMERICA 5 (2005), available at http:// 
www.defenselink.mil/news/Mar2005/d20050318nds2.pdf (stating that the Unit-
ed States will be challenged “by those who employ a strategy of the weak using 
international fora, judicial processes, and terrorism”); David J. Barron & Mar-
tin S. Lederman, The Commander in Chief at the Lowest Ebb—Framing the 
Problem, Doctrine, and Original Understanding, 121 HARV. L. REV. 689, 706, 
709–10 (2008) (describing administration attempts to limit or preclude judicial 
review of executive detention decisions). For an account of the views animat-
ing this policy, see JACK GOLDSMITH, THE TERROR PRESIDENCY 53–64 (2009). 
 21. Katharine Q. Seelye, Threats and Responses: The Detainees, N.Y. 
TIMES, Oct. 23, 2002, at A14, available at 2002 WL 4103459; see also JANE 
MAYER, THE DARK SIDE 183 (2008) (describing the difficulties of identifying 
and interviewing Guantánamo detainees). 
 22. Military Order of Nov. 13, 2001, Detention, Treatment, and Trial of 
Certain Non-Citizens in the War Against Terrorism, 3 C.F.R. 918 (2001), re-
printed in 10 U.S.C. § 801 (Supp. IV 2004) (ordering that detainees be tried by 
military tribunal); see also Cole, supra note 19, at 726 (detailing the Adminis-
tration’s expansive power at Guantánamo). 
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on his Article II powers as Commander in Chief23 and the Sep-
tember 18, 2001, Authorization of the Use of Military Force 
(AUMF), which endorsed the President’s use of “all necessary 
and appropriate force against the nations, organizations, or 
persons he determines planned, authorized, committed, or 
aided” the 9/11 attacks.24 While all three branches weighed in 
on whether the detainees would have access to the courts, the 
Supreme Court had the final word in Boumediene v. Bush.25 
This Part situates the district court litigation in this context by 
examining the Court’s limited approval of executive detention, 
the ensuing responses of the political branches, and the Court’s 
decision in Boumediene. 
A. THE PRESIDENT, CONGRESS, AND THE COURT ON EXECUTIVE 
DETENTION 
The Supreme Court first tested the Bush Administration’s 
expansive claims of detention authority in Hamdi v. Rums-
feld.26 Captured on the battlefield in Afghanistan, Yaser Hamdi 
spent three years imprisoned as an “enemy combatant” before 
the Court heard his habeas corpus petition, which argued that 
there was no legal authority for his continued detention.27 Five 
members of the Court disagreed.28 The plurality interpreted the 
AUMF’s blanket authorization of “necessary and appropriate 
force” to “clearly and unmistakably” authorize detention of 
“enemy combatants” in certain circumstances.29 Adopting “for 
 
 23. Brief for Respondents at 22, Hamdi v. Rumsfeld, 542 U.S. 507 (2004) 
(No. 03-6696); Brief for Petitioner at 27, Rumsfeld v. Padilla, 542 U.S. 426 
(2004) (No. 03-1027). See generally Barron & Lederman, supra note 20, at 706, 
709–10 (describing the Administration’s reliance on Article II).  
 24. Authorization for Use of Military Force (AUMF), Pub. L. No. 107-40, 
115 Stat. 224 (2001) (conferring such authorization “in order to prevent any 
future acts of international terrorism against the United States by such na-
tions, organizations or persons”). 
 25. 553 U.S. 723, 798 (2008). 
 26. 542 U.S. 507, 509 (2004) (plurality opinion). 
 27. Id. at 510–11. Hamdi also raised constitutional and statutory objec-
tions to his detention. Id. at 511. 
 28. Id. at 519–20 (plurality opinion); id. at 589 (Thomas, J., dissenting) 
(stating that Hamdi’s detention falls “squarely within the Federal Govern-
ment’s war powers, and we lack the expertise and capacity to second-guess 
that decision”). But see id. at 545 (Souter, J., concurring in part, dissenting in 
part, and concurring in the judgment); id. at 554 (Scalia, J., dissenting). 
 29. Id. at 519–20. See generally Curtis A. Bradley & Jack L. Goldsmith, 
Congressional Authorization and the War on Terrorism, 118 HARV. L. REV. 
2047, 2078–133 (2005) (extrapolating from Hamdi a general framework for 
interpreting the AUMF in the context of the war on terror).  
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purposes of th[e] case” the government’s proposed definition of 
“enemy combatant,” the Court held simply that this category 
encompassed those individuals “part of or supporting forces 
hostile to the United States . . . and who engaged in an armed 
conflict against the United States [in Afghanistan].”30 The 
Court further observed that the purpose of wartime detention 
is not punitive, but rather to prevent captured enemies from re-
turning to the fight against the United States.31 Hamdi thus 
established that the President has explicit statutory authority 
to detain “enemy combatants” for this purpose. 
Yet Hamdi rejected the view that the government’s en-
dorsement is sufficient to justify detention.32 Balancing the 
value of requiring procedural protections against their impact 
on military effectiveness,33 the plurality held that a citizen de-
tainee “must receive notice of the factual basis for his classifi-
cation, and a fair opportunity to rebut the Government’s factual 
assertions before a neutral decisionmaker.”34 Four members of 
the Court, however, observed that the proceedings could be tai-
lored to accommodate the “uncommon potential to burden the 
Executive at a time of ongoing military conflict,” through, for 
example, the admission of hearsay evidence and a rebuttable 
presumption in favor of the government’s evidence.35 Neither 
the plurality nor Justice Souter’s concurrence attempted to 
clarify the outer bounds of the “enemy combatant” concept.36 
On the same day that it rooted the President’s detention au-
thority in the AUMF, the Court held in Rasul v. Bush that the 
 
 30. Hamdi, 542 U.S. at 516, 526; see also Bradley & Goldsmith, supra 
note 29, at 2107–16. 
 31. Hamdi, 542 U.S. at 518. 
 32. Id. at 533. 
 33. Id. at 528–35 (applying the procedural due process test articulated in 
Mathews v. Eldridge, 424 U.S. 319, 335 (1976)). 
 34. Id. at 524–25, 533. For criticism of the Court’s approach, see John 
Yoo, Courts at War, 91 CORNELL L. REV. 573, 587–88 (2006). 
 35. Hamdi, 542 U.S. at 533–34. In joining the plurality “to produce a 
judgment,” Justice Souter explicitly disclaimed his assent on these points. Id. 
at 553–54 (Souter, J., concurring in part, dissenting in part, and concurring in 
the judgment). See generally Richard H. Fallon, Jr. & Daniel Meltzer, Habeas 
Corpus Jurisdiction, Substantive Rights, and the War on Terror, 120 HARV. L. 
REV. 2029, 2091–93 (2007) (discussing the ambiguities as to proof that Hamdi’s 
discussion of procedure introduced). 
 36. See Hamdi, 542 U.S. at 522 n.1. The term is ill-defined in domestic law 
and unknown to international law. E.g., Allison M. Danner, Defining Unlawful 
Enemy Combatants: A Centripetal Story, 43 TEX. INT’L L.J. 1, 2–7 (2007); Marc 
D. Falkoff, Back to Basics: Habeas Corpus Procedures and Long-Term Executive 
Detention, 86 DENV. U. L. REV. 961, 991 n.144 (2009). 
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detainees could challenge their detention through the habeas 
statute.37 Detainees soon flooded the courts with habeas peti-
tions.38  
The political branches responded to the rebukes of Hamdi 
and Rasul in several ways. First, the Bush Administration es-
tablished Combatant Status Review Tribunals (CSRTs)—
ostensibly designed to comply with the procedural dictates of 
Hamdi—to review detainees’ challenges to their designation as 
enemy combatants.39 Second, Congress passed the Detainee 
Treatment Act of 2005, which sought to nullify Rasul by strip-
ping federal courts of jurisdiction to hear habeas petitions of 
Guantánamo detainees.40 Without statutory access to the 
courts, the petitions languished until June 2008, when the Su-
preme Court decided Boumediene v. Bush.  
Boumediene held that noncitizen detainees can invoke the 
Constitution to challenge their detention by seeking a writ of 
habeas corpus.41 The Court also held that the procedures of the 
CSRT system fell short of an adequate substitute for habeas, 
and thus amounted to an unconstitutional suspension of the 
writ.42 While the Court expressly declined to clarify the bounds 
of executive detention under the AUMF,43 it made several ob-
 
 37. Rasul v. Bush, 542 U.S. 466, 483–84 (2004); see also 28 U.S.C. § 2241 
(2006). 
 38. See Al-Bihani v. Obama, 594 F. Supp. 2d 35, 37 (D.D.C. 2009), aff’d, 
590 F.3d 866 (D.C. Cir. 2010). 
 39. See Memorandum from Paul Wolfowitz, Deputy Sec’y of Def., Dep’t of 
Def., to the Sec’y of the Navy (July 7, 2004) [hereinafter CSRT Memo], availa-
ble at http://www.defenselink.mil/news/Jul2004/d20040707review.pdf. The memo 
provided detainees with a “personal representative,” allowed access to “rea-
sonably available” information, and permitted the detainee to call witnesses “if 
reasonably available.” Id.; see also Fallon & Meltzer, supra note 35, at 2100 & 
n.286. See generally Chesney & Goldsmith, supra note 13, at 1110–12 (con-
trasting procedural safeguards of CSRT process with criminal procedures).  
 40. Detainee Treatment Act, Pub. L. No. 109-148, § 1005(e), 119 Stat. 
2680, 2741–42 (2005). In Hamdan v. Rumsfeld, the Supreme Court held that 
the Detainee Treatment Act (DTA) did not apply retroactively so as to deprive 
the courts of jurisdiction over suits pending at the time of its passage. 548 U.S. 
557, 575–76 (2006). Congress responded in the Military Commissions Act of 
2006 by expressly stripping the courts of jurisdiction to hear petitions pending 
at the time of the DTA’s passage. Military Commissions Act, Pub. L. No. 109-
366, § 7(a), 120 Stat. 2600, 2635–36 (2006). 
 41. Boumediene I, 553 U.S. 723, 732 (2008). 
 42. Id. at 732, 767 (enumerating deficiencies in the CSRT process). 
 43. Id. at 732, 779–80, 787. For one framework that clarifies the bounds of 
executive detention, derived from the law of war, see Matthew C. Waxman, 
Detention as Targeting: Standards of Certainty and Detention of Suspected 
Terrorists, 108 COLUM. L. REV. 1365, 1369–1402 (2008). 
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servations on which the lower courts have relied heavily in ad-
judicating Guantánamo habeas cases. 
The Court held that a habeas petitioner must have a 
“meaningful opportunity to demonstrate that he is being held 
pursuant to the erroneous application or interpretation of rele-
vant law.”44 The majority also emphasized that habeas is an 
“adaptable remedy,” the precise application of which varies 
over time and depends, in part, on the rigor of earlier proceed-
ings.45 Habeas, therefore, can be tailored to accommodate the 
government’s “legitimate interest in protecting sources and 
methods of intelligence gathering.”46 Furthermore, the purpose 
and intended duration of detention bear on the scope of habeas 
review, rendering detention of potentially indefinite duration 
especially amenable to judicial scrutiny.47  
Moreover, habeas proceedings must be more than a rubber 
stamp; they must be “effective” and “meaningful.”48 The Court 
paid particular attention to the prospect of errors in the CSRT 
fact-finding process, which the majority found required that 
habeas courts have “some authority to assess the sufficiency of 
the Government’s evidence”49 and “to admit and consider rele-
vant exculpatory evidence” not introduced in the earlier pro-
ceeding.50 The Court, however, declined to clarify just how 
much evidence the government must present.51 Lastly, Boume-
diene emphasized the urgency of the habeas proceedings.52 Not-
ing that some detainees had been held for more than six years 
without judicial oversight, Justice Kennedy intoned for the ma-
jority that “the costs of delay can no longer be borne by those 
who are held in custody.”53 The lower courts were thus charged 
with putting these vague principles into practice in short order. 
 
 44. Boumediene I, 553 U.S. at 779 (internal quotation marks and citation 
omitted). 
 45. Id. at 779–87. 
 46. Id. at 796. 
 47. See id. at 783. 
 48. Id. The D.C. Circuit has since declared “meaningfulness” to be “the 
touchstone” of the Guantánamo habeas proceedings, the practical result of 
which is to vest district court judges with heightened flexibility. See Al-Bihani 
v. Obama, 590 F.3d 866, 880 (D.C. Cir. 2010) (making this point in the eviden-
tiary context). 
 49. Boumediene I, 553 U.S. at 786. 
 50. Id. at 729. 
 51. Id. at 787, 795–96. 
 52. Id. at 795 (“The detainees in these cases are entitled to a prompt ha-
beas corpus hearing.”). 
 53. Id. 
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B. PRECEDENT FRAMING THE HABEAS LITIGATION 
After Boumediene, but before the D.C. Circuit began hand-
ing down habeas decisions on the merits in January 2010, two 
circuit courts addressed some substantive and procedural is-
sues Boumediene left unresolved.54 Eight days after Boume-
diene, in a case arising under the CSRT process, the D.C. Cir-
cuit addressed the kind of evidence upon which the government 
can rely in seeking to detain an individual as an enemy combat-
ant.55 In Parhat v. Gates, the court rejected the government’s 
attempt to justify detention solely on the basis of hearsay evi-
dence and held that the government must provide enough in-
formation for the court to assess the credibility of its sources 
and the reliability of the information on which it bases its case 
for detention.56 In Al-Marri v. Puccarelli, the Fourth Circuit 
addressed the scope of the President’s detention authority un-
der the AUMF, holding that Al-Marri, a legal U.S. resident, 
could be detained as an enemy combatant, but that the process 
used to determine his status as a combatant was constitutional-
ly insufficient.57 In seven separate opinions running more than 
two hundred pages, the fourth circuit judges offered differing 
views as to the scope of the President’s detention authority un-
der the AUMF and Hamdi.58 District court judges would later 
draw on these cases in adjudicating habeas petitions.  
And the D.C. district courts were soon flooded with them.59 
In order to address the cases “as expeditiously as possible per 
the Supreme Court’s decision in Boumediene,” the D.C. district 
court designated Chief Judge Thomas Hogan “to coordinate and 
 
 54. See Al-Marri v. Pucciarelli, 534 F.3d 213, 216 (4th Cir. 2008) (per cu-
riam), vacated, Al-Marri v. Spagone, 129 S. Ct. 1545 (2009) (mem.); Parhat v. 
Gates, 532 F.3d 834 passim (D.C. Cir. 2008). The D.C. Circuit’s rulings on the 
merits in habeas cases are discussed below. 
 55. Parhat, 532 F.3d at 834, 842–46. 
 56. Id. at 846–47, 850. 
 57. Al-Marri, 534 F.3d at 216. After the Supreme Court granted certiora-
ri, President Obama transferred Al-Marri to civilian custody and the Supreme 
Court vacated the appeal as moot. Al-Marri, 129 S. Ct. at 1545. 
 58. Al-Marri, 534 F.3d at 216–352. The D.C. Circuit has distinguished Al-
Marri from Guantánamo habeas petitioners to the extent the latter are non-
citizens seized in a foreign country. Al-Bihani v. Obama, 590 F.3d 866, 877 
(D.C. Cir. 2010). 
 59. When Boumediene was decided, there were about 200 habeas petitions 
pending before the federal courts in Washington, D.C., where all Guantánamo 
habeas petitions are now heard. Josh White & Del Quentin Wilber, Guanta-
namo Detainee to File Habeas Petition, WASH. POST, June 26, 2008, at A14; 
Goldsmith, supra note 13, at 18 n.20 (explaining the organic process by which 
all habeas cases came before the D.C. district courts). 
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manage” the Guantánamo litigation.60 After consolidated brief-
ing and oral arguments on procedural issues common to all the 
habeas cases, Judge Hogan issued a Case Management Order 
(CMO) setting forth the procedural framework for the litiga-
tion.61 The CMO addresses the range of procedural issues 
common to the pending habeas petitions, including discovery, 
burden of proof, and access to classified evidence.62 Significant-
ly, it requires the government to disclose any exculpatory evi-
dence in its possession to detainees.63 Beyond this measure, the 
judges may allow only “limited” discovery for “good cause.”64 
The government must prove the lawfulness of the petitioner’s 
detention by a preponderance of the evidence; it must be “more 
likely than not” that the detainee satisfies the legal standard.65 
Critically, each judge retains the option to accord a “rebuttable 
presumption” of accuracy and/or authenticity to the govern-
ment’s evidence and to decide whether to admit hearsay evi-
dence.66 Equally important to the district courts’ adjudication of 
the habeas cases is the executive branch’s legal position.67 The 
next section reviews President Obama’s shift in Guantánamo 
 
 60. In re Petitioners Seeking Relief at Guantánamo Bay, 567 F. Supp. 2d 
83, 83 (2008). 
 61. In re Guantanamo Bay Detainee Litig. (CMO), No. 08-0442, 2008 WL 
4858241, at *1–3 (D.D.C. Nov. 6, 2008). See generally Falkoff, supra note 36, 
at 1019–21 (discussing the CMO). Most judges have adopted some form of 
Judge Hogan’s CMO, which contemplates that individual judges “may alter 
the framework based on the particular facts and circumstances of [the cases].” 
CMO, 2008 WL 4858241, at *1 n.1. 
 62. CMO, 2008 WL 4858241, at *1–5. 
 63. Id. at *1–2 (citing Boumediene I, 553 U.S. 723, 786 (2008)). 
 64. Id. at *2. 
 65. Id. at *3. For criticism of this standard, see Falkoff, supra note 36, at 
1021. See also Waxman, supra note 43, at 1402–03, 1408–12 (proposing, in 
part, an escalating certainty standard: the longer a detainee remains in custo-
dy, the higher the burden to justify detention). The D.C. Circuit has since re-
peatedly held that the preponderance standard is constitutional. See, e.g., Awad 
v. Obama, 608 F.3d 1, 10 (D.C. Cir. 2010) (citing Al-Bihani v. Obama, 590 F.3d 
866, 878 (D.C. Cir. 2010)). It has also repeatedly stated in dicta, however, that 
while constitutionally permissible, the preponderance standard may not be 
constitutionally required. Id. at 10 n.2; Al-Adahi v. Obama, 613 F.3d 1102, 
1104 (D.C. Cir. 2010) (“For years, in habeas proceedings . . . the government 
had to produce only ‘some evidence to support the order.’” (citation omitted)).  
 66. CMO, 2008 WL 4858241, at *3. As discussed below, however, the ad-
missibility of hearsay evidence is no longer discretionary. “[T]he question a 
habeas court must ask when presented with hearsay is not whether it is admiss-
ible—it is always admissible—but what probative weight to ascribe to whatev-
er indicia of reliability it exhibits.” Al-Bihani, 590 F.3d at 879; see also Al 
Odah v. United States, 611 F.3d 8, 12–14 (D.C. Cir. 2010) (citing relevant cases). 
 67. See, e.g., Gherebi v. Obama, 609 F. Supp. 2d 43, 52 (D.D.C. 2009). 
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policy and situates the habeas litigation in the broader context 
of the administrative detention debate. 
C. THE OBAMA ADMINISTRATION AND THE DETENTION DEBATE 
In January 2009, less than an hour after President Oba-
ma’s inauguration, the government requested a stay of the 
pending detainee proceedings to “reassess its position on the 
scope of the President’s authority to detain the petitioners as 
so-called ‘enemy combatants.’”68 Following this reassessment, 
the Obama Administration dropped the term “enemy combat-
ant” and now presses a more limited position as to the scope of 
its detention authority under the AUMF, arguing that it has 
the authority to detain “persons who were part of, or substan-
tially supported” the Taliban or al Qaeda.69 After a comprehen-
sive review of all 196 detainees then held at Guantánamo, the 
Obama Administration concluded that approximately thirty-
five should be tried in federal or military courts, 110 should be 
released, and nearly fifty must be detained indefinitely without 
trial.70 While the habeas litigation may be most pressing for the 
latter group, the courts have likely adjudicated only about one-
third to one-half of all pending cases.71 In short, notwithstand-
ing Boumediene’s call for urgency, the habeas litigation will 
continue for years to come. 
 
 68. Id. at 52–53. Two days after his inauguration, Obama issued an ex-
ecutive order calling for the immediate review of the status of all remaining 
Guantánamo detainees and committed to close the prison within one year. Ex-
ec. Order No. 13,492, 74 Fed. Reg. 4897 (Jan. 27, 2009).  
 69. Respondents Memorandum Regarding the Government’s Detention 
Authority Relative to Detainees Held at Guantanamo Bay at 2, In re Guantá-
namo Bay Detainee Litig., No. 08-442 (D.D.C. Mar. 13, 2009) [hereinafter Oba-
ma Brief ]. That filing was quoted by other courts. E.g., Anam v. Obama, 653 
F. Supp. 2d 62, 63 (D.D.C. 2009). For more background, see Ved P. Nanda, In-
troductory Essay: International Law Implications of the United States’ “War on 
Terror,” 37 DENV. J. INT’L L. & POL’Y 513, 519–20 (2009). Significantly, Presi-
dent Obama dropped the Article II argument, pressed by the Bush Adminis-
tration, that the President has the inherent authority under the Commander 
in Chief Clause to detain suspected terrorists. E.g., Gherebi, 609 F. Supp. 2d 
at 53 & n.4. 
 70. Peter Finn, Panel on Guantanamo Backs Indefinite Detention for 
Some, WASH. POST, Jan. 22, 2010, at A1; see also GUANTÁNAMO REVIEW TASK 
FORCE, FINAL REPORT (2010), available at http://www.justice.gov/ag/ 
guantanamo-review-final-report.pdf. 
 71. Robert Chesney, The Emerging Law of Detention: The Guantánamo 
Habeas Cases As Lawmaking, Address at the U.S. Naval War College Interna-
tional Law Conference (June 22–24, 2006), available at http://www.usnwc.edu/ 
Events/International-Law-Conference-2010.aspx (scroll to “Luncheon Address”; 
then click on image at left to play video). 
  
256 MINNESOTA LAW REVIEW [95:244 
 
The implications of the Guantánamo litigation, moreover, 
extend well beyond the approximately 175 remaining detain-
ees72: the national debate about Guantánamo often serves as a 
proxy for the larger debate about “administrative,”73 “preven-
tive,”74 or “non-criminal”75 detention in the “war on terror.”76 
Some argue, for example, that the United States should adopt a 
more formalized system of detention, in which some combina-
tion of federal judges and military personnel would preside over 
detention decisions in the first instance.77 The current system 
of habeas review is, in many respects, strikingly similar to 
some such proposals. In effect, Hamdi and Boumediene have 
already created a system of noncriminal detention.78 The rul-
ings analyzed in Part II, therefore, affect not just the remaining 
Guantánamo detainees, but all future noncitizen detainees to 
whom the courts extend habeas rights.79 The habeas litigation 
 
 72. Habeas Scorecard, supra note 8. 
 73. E.g., William Glaberson, Obama Detention Plan Poses Fundamental 
Test, N.Y. TIMES, May 23, 2009, at A1, available at 2009 WL 9829007. 
 74. See, e.g., Lindsey Graham & John McCain, Op-Ed., How to Handle the 
Guantanamo Detainees, WALL ST. J., May 6, 2009, at A15. 
 75. E.g., Wittes & Goldsmith, supra note 15. 
 76. E.g., Editorial, An Obama-Bush Victory, WALL ST. J., May 24, 2010, 
at A16. 
 77. See, e.g., SULMASY, supra note 11, at 157–58, 173–93; BENJAMIN 
WITTES, LAW AND THE LONG WAR 174–78 (2008) (discussing the debate); Kev-
in E. Lunday & Harvey Rishikof, Due Process Is a Strategic Choice: Legitimacy 
and the Establishment of an Article III National Security Court, 39 CAL. W. 
INT’L L.J. 87, 94 (2008); Jack L. Goldsmith & Neal Katyal, The Terrorists’ 
Court, N.Y. TIMES, July 11, 2007, at A19, available at 2007 WL 13087601. But 
see STEPHANIE COOPER BLUM, THE NECESSARY EVIL OF PREVENTIVE DE-
TENTION IN THE WAR ON TERROR 181–90 (2008); Stephen I. Vladeck, The Case 
Against National Security Courts, 45 WILLAMETTE L. REV. 505, 523–25 (2009). 
 78. See, e.g., Goldsmith, supra note 13, at 2 (arguing that “the national 
security court debate . . . is largely a canard,” because “we have had a central-
ized and thinly institutionalized national security court for years in the federal 
courts of the District of Columbia, which have been supervising Guantánamo 
Bay military detentions”). 
 79. In May 2010, a panel of the D.C. Circuit held that habeas rights do 
not extend to detainees held in Afghanistan. Al Maqaleh v. Gates, 605 F.3d 84, 
99 (D.C. Cir. 2010). Request for en banc review is pending, but the issue will 
not be definitively settled even if the full court declines review or upholds the 
panel’s decision. The highly fact-bound opinion left room for individual detain-
ees to press the issue: while the court has since refused to reconsider the rul-
ing, it did so without evaluating the detainees’ new claim, and stated that its 
denial of rehearing was “without prejudice” to the detainees’ opportunity to 
offer their evidence to a district judge “in the first instance.” Al Maqaleh v. 
Gates, No. 09-5265 (D.C. Cir. July 23, 2010) (per curiam) (order denying petition 
for rehearing). 
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is thus intimately bound up with broader detention policy.80 It 
is also sure to affect military decisionmaking outside of the de-
tention context.81 The following Part analyzes the district court 
litigation, highlighting early cleavages among judges on a 
number of substantive and procedural issues. It then shows 
how the D.C. Circuit has resolved these divisions and developed 
an increasingly coherent body of jurisprudence that militates 
against new detention legislation. 
II.  TOWARD A NATIONAL SECURITY COURT   
Since Boumediene announced that habeas is a constitu-
tional right for Guantánamo detainees, the federal district 
courts in Washington, D.C. have addressed a host of novel legal 
questions. It is useful to break down the applicable rulings 
along substantive and procedural axes.82 Substantive rulings 
relate to the scope of the President’s detention authority under 
the AUMF. Procedural issues deal with the degree and nature 
of the process to which detainees are entitled under the limited 
guidance of Boumediene and Hamdi. This Part examines the 
district courts’ rulings on both substantive and procedural is-
sues, paying close attention to uniformity among different 
judges and their various approaches to balancing the govern-
ment’s national security concerns and detainees’ liberty inter-
ests. It argues that in the first eighteen months of litigation, 
while the district courts were largely deferential to the gov-
ernment, certain judges narrowed detention authority in im-
portant ways, creating splits on both substantive and proce-
dural issues that may have led to different outcomes for 
similarly situated detainees. It then demonstrates that the 
D.C. Circuit has resolved the most salient disagreements, lead-
ing to a convergence of detention standards.  
 
 80. See, e.g., WITTES, supra note 77, at 152–53; Stuart Taylor, Jr., Lessons 
of the Christmas Bombing Plot, NAT’L J., Jan. 9, 2010, at 2 (discussing novel 
detention issues raised by the attempt to which no policy response exists).  
 81. Al-Bihani v. Obama, 590 F.3d 866, 877 (D.C. Cir. 2010) (“Requiring 
highly protective procedures at the tail end of the detention process . . . would 
have systemic effects on the military’s entire approach to war.”); Charlie Sav-
age, Obama Team Split on Tactics Against Terror, N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 29, 2010, 
at A1, available at 2010 WL 6494620. See generally Waxman, supra note 43, 
at 1385–1402 (analogizing detention and targeting standards). 
 82. See, e.g., Fallon & Meltzer, supra note 35, at 2037–39 (describing ha-
beas actions as presenting at least three kinds of questions—jurisdictional, 
substantive, and procedural). 
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A. SUBSTANTIVE DETENTION STANDARDS: SHADES OF 
DEFERENCE 
Hamdi held that the AUMF authorizes the President to de-
tain “enemy combatants,” but left the precise scope of this au-
thority undefined.83 Boumediene effectively delegated this 
thorny task to the district courts.84 While federal judges gener-
ally have declined to craft standards of their own, they have 
displayed varying degrees of deference to the government’s 
proposed standards. Moreover, judges have displayed strikingly 
different views about the nature of the inquiry: at least one 
judge read Hamdi to require an assessment of detainee danger-
ousness,85 whereas other judges rejected this approach.86 But 
even if district court judges cannot agree, recent decisions by 
the D.C. Circuit have harmonized standards that may other-
wise have resulted in an increasingly fragmented jurispru-
dence.87 The common-law process mandated by Boumediene is, 
in short, working.  
1. Deferential Approaches 
Some judges have largely deferred to the Executive—both 
President Bush and President Obama—as to the scope of ex-
ecutive detention authority. In light of the Supreme Court’s ap-
proval of the detention of “enemy combatants” under the 
AUMF in Hamdi, the critical issues for the Bush Administra-
tion after Boumediene were what constituted an “enemy com-
batant,” and whether the detainee met this definition.88 Judge 
Richard Leon took the lead in adjudicating Guantánamo ha-
beas petitions, deciding six cases from November 2008 to early 
April 2009.89 Judge Leon was therefore the first to opine on the 
 
 83. Hamdi v. Rumsfeld, 542 U.S. 507, 519–22 (2004) (plurality opinion). 
 84. Boumediene I, 553 U.S. 723, 787, 795–96 (2008). 
 85. Basardh v. Obama, 612 F. Supp. 2d 30, 30–35 (D.D.C. 2009). 
 86. See, e.g., Awad v. Obama, 646 F. Supp. 2d 20, 23 (D.D.C. 2009). 
 87. For a lengthier and purely descriptive treatment of some judges’ posi-
tions, see HABEAS LAWMAKING, supra note 15, at 16–31. 
 88. See, e.g., Boumediene v. Bush (Boumediene II), 579 F. Supp. 2d 191, 
196 (D.D.C. 2008). 
 89. Hammamy v. Obama, 604 F. Supp. 2d 240 (D.D.C. 2009); Al-Bihani v. 
Obama, 594 F. Supp. 2d 35 (D.D.C. 2009); El Gharani v. Bush, 593 F. Supp. 2d 
144 (D.D.C. 2009); Boumediene II, 579 F. Supp. 2d 191 (D.D.C. 2008); Al Alwi 
v. Bush, 593 F. Supp. 2d 24 (D.D.C. 2008); Sliti v. Bush, 592 F. Supp. 2d 46 
(D.D.C. 2008). 
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scope of detention authority after Boumediene90 and the only 
judge to rule on the Bush Administration’s proposed definition 
of “enemy combatant.”91 Declining to “engage in the judicial 
craftsmanship” of Al-Marri v. Pucciarelli, Judge Leon opted for 
an approach more deferential to the political branches.92 He 
adopted, ironically, the Department of Defense’s definition 
created for use in the CSRT process93—the process Boumediene 
struck down as constitutionally inadequate.94 The Department 
of Defense defined the term “enemy combatant” as “an individ-
ual who was part of or supporting Taliban or al Qaeda forces, or 
associated forces that are engaged in hostilities against the 
United States or its coalition partners,” including “any person 
who has committed a belligerent act or has directly supported 
hostilities in aid of enemy forces.”95 Judge Leon thought that 
Congress had “blessed” this definition because the 2006 Mili-
tary Commissions Act (MCA) defined “unlawful enemy combat-
ant” to include those so determined by the CSRT.96 Applying 
the Department of Defense’s standard, Judge Leon found it 
more likely than not that five of eleven petitioners were “part of 
or supporting” al Qaeda or the Taliban.97 
On March 13, 2009, roughly five weeks after the Obama 
Administration altered the government’s legal position, Judge 
Reggie Walton adopted the President’s new framework whole-
sale in Gherebi v. Obama.98 Judge Walton rejected the detain-
ees’ argument that only individuals who directly participated in 
 
 90. Boumediene v. Bush (Boumediene III), 583 F. Supp. 2d 133, 133 
(D.D.C. 2009) (adjudicating the original Boumediene litigation on remand from 
the Supreme Court and D.C. Circuit). While Judge Ricardo Urbina was the 
first to decide a habeas petition in the wake of Boumediene, he did not rule on 
the scope of detention authority under the AUMF. See In re Guantánamo Bay 
Detainee Litig., 581 F. Supp. 2d 33, 34 (D.D.C. 2008), vacated, Kiyemba v. Oba-
ma, 130 S. Ct. 1235 (2010). 
 91. USA: Judge Orders Release of Detainee Held in Guantànamo as Child 
‘Enemy Combatant,’ AMNESTY INT’L n.4 (Jan. 15, 2009), http://www 
.amnestyusa.org/document.php?lang=e&id=ENGAMR510062009. The Obama 
Administration soon dropped the term “enemy combatant” and altered its po-
sition as to who is detainable under the AUMF. See Obama Brief, supra note 
69, at 2. 
 92. Boumediene III, 583 F. Supp. 2d at 134. 
 93. Id. at 134–35.  
 94. Boumediene I, 553 U.S. 723, 767 (2008).  
 95. CSRT Memo, supra note 39, at 1. 
 96. Boumediene III, 583 F. Supp. 2d at 134; see also 10 U.S.C. § 948a(1) 
(2006). 
 97. See supra note 89 (listing cases decided by Judge Leon).  
 98. 609 F. Supp. 2d 43 (D.D.C. 2009).  
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hostilities against the United States were subject to detention 
under Hamdi’s construction of the AUMF,99 and found that the 
government’s “substantial support” standard comported with 
the law of war as long as it is restricted to those individuals 
that are effectively part of the armed forces of an enemy organ-
ization at the time of their capture.100 In short, Judge Walton 
accepted both the government’s standard for detention and its 
suggested framework for interpreting that standard under the 
law of war.101  
Moreover, to address a detainee’s challenge to the condi-
tions of his confinement each of the judges has construed Bou-
mediene narrowly, to the great benefit of the government.102 
Specifically, the courts have held that even in striking down 
the jurisdiction-stripping provision of the MCA, Boumediene 
left intact the following subsection, which stripped the courts of 
jurisdiction to hear claims relating to conditions of confine-
ment.103 While the courts characterize this holding as an exer-
cise in statutory interpretation, one senses a measure of defer-
ence to the government in the admissions that “the issue is not 
absolutely clear-cut” and that Boumediene did not distinguish 
between the two subsections at issue.104 
 
 99. Id. at 53, 69–70; see also id. at 64 n.15. 
 100. Id. at 69–70. Under Walton’s standard, the President can detain those 
who are connected to the command structure of the organization, but not 
“[s]ympathizers, propagandists, and financiers,” unless they take direct part 
in hostilities. Id. at 68–69. 
 101. The D.C. Circuit has since rejected the law of war as a framework for 
interpreting detention authority under the AUMF. Al-Bihani v. Obama, 590 
F.3d 866, 871 (D.C. Cir. 2010) (stating that many of Al-Bihani’s arguments 
“rely heavily on the premise that the war powers granted by the AUMF and 
other statutes are limited by the international laws of war. This premise is 
mistaken.”). This position is more expansive than the standard put forward by 
the Obama Administration. See Obama Brief, supra note 69, at 2. In denying 
en banc review, however, every active member of the D.C. Circuit not on the 
three-judge Al-Bihani panel joined in a statement characterizing the panel’s 
discussion of the law of war as dicta. Al-Bihani v. Obama, No. 09-5051, 2010 
WL 3398392, at *1 (D.C. Cir. Aug. 31, 2010). Notwithstanding more categori-
cal language in various concurring opinions, the precise role of the Geneva 
Conventions in the Guantánamo litigation thus remains, as a formal matter, 
unsettled. 
 102. Al-Zahrani v. Rumsfeld, 684 F. Supp. 2d 103, 108–09 (D.C.C. 2009); 
Tumani v. Obama, 598 F. Supp. 2d 67, 69 (D.D.C. 2009); Al-Adahi v. Obama, 
596 F. Supp. 2d 111, 118 (D.D.C. 2009); Khadr v. Bush, 587 F. Supp. 2d 225, 
233–36 (D.D.C. 2008); In re Guantanamo Bay Detainee Litig., 577 F. Supp. 2d 
312, 313 (D.D.C. 2008); In re Guantanamo Bay Detainee Litig., 570 F. Supp. 
2d 13, 17–19 (D.D.C. 2008).  
 103. E.g., Al-Adahi, 596 F. Supp. 2d at 118. 
 104. Id.; see also In re Guantanamo Bay Detainee Litig., 570 F. Supp. 2d at 18. 
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2. Less Deferential Approaches 
Less than a month after Gherebi, Judge John D. Bates 
came to a different conclusion about the President’s detention 
authority.105 After acknowledging that some measure of defer-
ence is due to the executive,106 Judge Bates rejected the gov-
ernment’s theory of “substantial support” as a concept improp-
erly imported from the criminal law and without basis in 
domestic or international law.107 Rather, Judge Bates limited 
the President’s detention authority to those individuals who are 
“part of Taliban or al Qaeda forces or associated forces that are 
engaged in hostilities against the United States or its coalition 
partners, including any person who has committed (i.e., directly 
participated in) a belligerent act in aid of such enemy armed 
forces.”108 The gravamen of the “part of” inquiry is whether the 
individual functions as part of the command structure of an or-
ganization; the key question is whether the individual “receives 
and executes orders.”109 Judge Bates thus adopted a narrower 
view of the President’s detention authority than did Judge Wal-
ton.110 
Judge Bates minimized the importance of the distinction 
between his approach and Judge Walton’s,111 and, on the one 
hand, he may be right. The concept of “support” is often proba-
tive of who is “part of” the covered organizations.112 Moreover, 
Judge Walton overlaid the “substantial support” concept with 
such interpretive caveats as to arguably eviscerate the plain 
meaning of the term “support.”113 As a practical matter, then, 
 
 105. Hamlily v. Obama, 616 F. Supp. 2d 63, 69 (D.D.C. 2009). 
 106. Id. at 68–69. 
 107. Id. at 69, 76. 
 108. Id. at 77–78. 
 109. Id. at 75 (citing Bradley & Goldsmith, supra note 29, at 2114–15).  
 110. There is language in Gherebi v. Obama that can be read to undermine 
this distinction. While nominally accepting the “substantial support” standard, 
Judge Walton would exclude “individuals outside the military command struc-
ture of an enemy organization, as that term is understood in view of [law of 
war principles].” 609 F. Supp. 2d 43, 70 (D.D.C. 2009).  
 111. Hamlily, 616 F. Supp. 2d at 76 (arguing that this difference “should 
not be great,” given the “functional” nature of the inquiry). Other judges agree. 
See Anam v. Obama, 653 F. Supp. 2d 62, 64 & n.2 (D.D.C. 2009) (Judge Ho-
gan) (describing the two approaches as “not inconsistent” and the difference as 
“largely one of form rather than substance”); Al-Adahi v. Obama, No. 05-280, 
2009 WL 2584685, at *3 n.2 (D.D.C. Aug. 21, 2009) (Judge Kessler), rev’d on 
other grounds, 613 F.3d 1102 (D.C. Cir. 2010). 
 112. Hamlily, 616 F. Supp. 2d at 76–77. 
 113. Gherebi, 609 F. Supp. 2d at 70. 
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many of those individuals that “substantially support” al Qaeda 
are also, as far as the courts are concerned, “part of” that 
group. 
On the other hand, if the term “support” is to retain any 
meaning independent of the “part of” prong, it is not difficult to 
imagine an individual who would be detainable in Judge Wal-
ton’s courtroom but not in Judge Bates’s.114 Both judges, for in-
stance, give the example of someone “tasked with housing, feed-
ing or transporting al-Qaeda fighters” as someone detainable 
under both the “substantial support” and “part of” prongs.115 
By Judge Bates’s reasoning, however, if the individual were not 
“tasked” with such duties, but rather undertook them of his or 
her own volition—that is, outside of the command structure—
he would not be “part of” al Qaeda and, consequently, would 
not be detainable. Given that such conduct almost certainly 
qualifies as “substantial support,” however, the opposite result 
would likely obtain under that standard.116 
 
 114. Indeed, the D.C. Circuit implicitly recognized the functional difference 
between the “support” and “membership” prongs in its only ruling to date on 
the merits favoring a detainee. In Bensayah v. Obama, the court reversed the 
district court’s denial of the writ on the ground that “the evidence on which 
the district court relied in concluding [the petitioner] ‘supported’ al Qaeda was 
insufficient . . . to show that he was ‘part of ’ that organization.” 610 F.3d 718, 
727 (D.C. Cir. 2010). 
 115. Hamlily, 616 F. Supp. 2d at 75 (applying the “tasked with” criteria to 
the “part of ” prong (quoting Gherebi, 609 F. Supp. 2d at 69)); Gherebi, 609 F. 
Supp. 2d at 69 (applying the “tasked with” criteria to the “substantial support” 
prong).  
 116. This result would turn on whether Judge Walton would consider 
“housing, feeding, or transporting al Qaeda fighters” to qualify as “direct par-
ticipation in hostilities.” See Gherebi, 609 F. Supp. 2d at 64–70. Because these 
tasks go well beyond “sympathiz[ing], propagand[izing], and financ[ing],” id. 
at 68, the answer seems to be “yes.” Until the D.C. Circuit addressed the issue, 
Judge Bates’s approach enjoyed more widespread adherence among district 
court judges than Judge Walton’s acceptance of the government’s standard; at 
least four other judges had adopted Judge Bates’s approach, whereas only 
Judge Kessler had opted for Judge Walton’s formulation. In other words, 
judges were trending toward a narrower view of executive detention authority. 
See, e.g., Anam v. Obama, 653 F. Supp. 2d 62, 64 (D.D.C. 2009) (Judge Hogan) 
(adopting Hamlily); Awad v. Obama, 646 F. Supp. 2d 20, 23 (D.D.C. 2009) 
(Judge Robertson) (same); Al Mutairi v. United States, 644 F. Supp. 2d 78, 85 
(D.D.C. 2009) (Judge Kollar-Kotelly) (same); Mattan v. Obama, 618 F. Supp. 
2d 24, 26 (D.D.C. 2009) (Judge Lamberth) (same). But see Al Adahi v. Obama, 
No. 05-280, 2009 WL 2584685, at *3, (D.D.C. Aug. 21, 2009) (Judge Kessler) 
(adopting Gherebi). 
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3. A Pragmatic Resolution 
But this crucial disagreement is now moot. In early 2010 
the D.C. Circuit made clear that both the membership and 
“support” prongs are valid—and independently sufficient—
bases for detention under the AUMF.117 Moreover, the court 
has also opined that membership in the “command structure” of 
al Qaeda or the Taliban is not necessary to justify detention, 
though it is sufficient.118 In other words, persons not integrated 
into the “command structure” of al Qaeda or the Taliban can be 
“part of” those organizations for purposes of detention under 
the AUMF. Specifically, the court reasoned that the President’s 
detention authority sweeps at least as broadly as the class of 
persons subject to trial by military commission under the 2006 
and 2009 Military Commissions Acts, which categorically in-
clude persons that have “purposefully and materially supported 
hostilities against the United States or its coalition part-
ners.”119 That is, if Congress has authorized the trial of such 
persons by military commission, it has necessarily authorized 
the President to detain them.120  
While one might question the court’s approach,121 this 
holding makes sense as a matter of policy and is a creative so-
lution to a potentially intractable problem. The AUMF empo-
wered the President “to prevent any future acts of international 
 
 117. Al-Bihani v. Obama, 590 F.3d 866, 874 (D.C. Cir. 2010). 
 118. Awad v. Obama, 608 F.3d 1, 11 (D.C. Cir. 2010) (“[Petitioner] argues 
that there must be a specific factual finding that he was part of the ‘command 
structure’ of al Qaeda. There is no such requirement under the AUMF.”); see 
also Bensayah v. Obama, 610 F.3d 718, 725 (D.C. Cir. 2010). 
 119. Al-Bihani, 590 F.3d at 872 (citing the Military Commissions Act of 
2009, Pub. L. No. 111-84, tit. XVIII, § 1802, 123 Stat. 2190, 2575–76) (codified 
at 10 U.S.C. §§ 948a(7), 948b(a), 948c); see also id. (noting that an unlawful 
enemy combatant includes “a person who has engaged in hostilities or who has 
purposefully and materially supported hostilities against the United States 
and its co-belligerents who is not a lawful enemy combatant” (quoting the Mil-
itary Commissions Act of 2006, Pub. L. No. 109-366, § 948a(1)(A)(i), 120 Stat. 
2600, 2601)).  
 120. See id. 
 121. It is uncontroversial that individuals subject to trial by military com-
mission will also be detained—at least for the period of the trial. In effect, 
however, the court derives substantive detention criteria from purely jurisdic-
tional and procedural provisions. The provisions of the MCA cited by the court 
note the Act’s purpose as “establish[ing] procedures governing the use of mili-
tary commissions to try alien unprivileged enemy belligerents,” define that 
category of persons, and state that such persons are subject to trial by military 
commission. 10 U.S.C § 948b(a); see also Al-Bihani, 590 F. Supp. 2d at 872 (cit-
ing 10 U.S.C. §§ 948a(7), 948b(a), 948c). 
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terrorism against the United States by such nations, organiza-
tions or persons.”122 To the extent a judge’s refusal to detain 
“substantial supporters” of al Qaeda (as opposed to members) 
would limit the President’s ability to prevent future attacks, it 
would undermine this central purpose of the AUMF.123 The 
same might be said of decisions restricting detention authority 
to al Qaeda’s “command structure.” But such results are now 
foreclosed by D.C. Circuit precedent. 
The AUMF—the undisputed basis of the President’s deten-
tion authority and the guiding light in the habeas litigation—
is, of course, vague. It does not describe the category of persons 
subject to detention; in fact, it does not mention detention at 
all.124 The D.C. Circuit’s holdings as to the President’s substan-
tive detention authority represent a pragmatic resolution of 
this problem. Whatever else might be said of this resolution, it 
strongly militates against further legislative action for the sake 
of national security. Indeed, the court has already keyed the 
President’s detention authority to recent “war on terror” legis-
lation. And if the D.C. Circuit has proved insufficiently protec-
tive of detainee rights,125 there is no reason to think a Congress 
that repeatedly attempted to strip the courts of habeas jurisdic-
tion would do any better by detainees. The following section de-
scribes the D.C. Circuit’s resolution of another early substan-
tive division among district court judges that might also have 
resulted in unequal application of the law. 
4. Dangerousness Assessments 
District court judges have also disagreed about the extent 
to which detainee dangerousness is relevant in defining the 
scope of the President’s detention authority. In Basardh v. Oba-
ma, Judge Huvelle ruled that the likelihood of a detainee’s re-
turn to the battlefield limits the scope of the President’s deten-
 
 122. Authorization for Use of Military Force (AUMF), Pub. L. No. 107-40, 
115 Stat. 224 (2001). 
 123. See Hamlily v. Obama, 616 F. Supp. 2d 63, 69–70 (D.D.C. 2009). 
Judge Bates conceded that the government’s position “may be attractive from 
a policy perspective, and indeed could be the basis for the development of fu-
ture domestic legislation or international law.” Id. at 76. 
 124. As explained above, the Supreme Court in Hamdi interpreted the 
AUMF’s authorization of “all necessary and appropriate force” to include de-
tention. Hamdi v. Rumsfeld, 542 U.S. 507, 519 (2004) (plurality opinion) (quot-
ing AUMF, § 2(a)). 
 125. See Andy Worthington, Guantánamo and Habeas Corpus: Wins and 
Losses, FUTURE FREEDOM FOUND. (July 19, 2010), http://www.fff.org/comment/ 
com1007f.asp (critically reviewing the D.C. Circuit opinions).  
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tion authority.126 In so holding, she emphasized that the AUMF 
authorized the use of force to prevent future acts of terrorism. 
Given that petitioner Muhammed Basardh had been exposed 
by name in the press as cooperating with U.S. authorities, 
Judge Huvelle found the prospect of his rejoining enemy forces 
to be “at best . . . remote,” which undermined the key rationale 
for his continued detention under Hamdi’s construction of the 
AUMF.127 Judge Huvelle thus imported an assessment of dan-
gerousness into the analysis of whether an individual is de-
tainable under the AUMF.  
Judge Leon adopted a similar position, though not explicit-
ly. In Al Ginco v. Obama, Judge Leon addressed the novel 
question of “whether a prior relationship between a detainee 
and al Qaeda (or the Taliban) can be sufficiently vitiated by the 
passage of time, intervening events, or both . . . .”128 The an-
swer resounded in the affirmative.129 Judge Leon found that 
petitioner Janko’s130 torture by al Qaeda into falsely confessing 
that he was spying for the United States along with his subse-
quent imprisonment by the Taliban “evince[d] a total eviscera-
tion of whatever relationship might have existed[.]”131 While 
not framed in terms of “dangerousness,” the clear implication of 
this reasoning is that Janko’s torture rendered him highly un-
likely to rejoin al Qaeda. Janko was, in short, no longer dan-
gerous.132 Therefore, the conclusion that a detainee’s status as 
“part of” al Qaeda may change over time functions as a similar 
limit on the President’s authority to detain.133 
 
 126. Basardh v. Obama, 612 F. Supp. 2d 30, 33–35 (D.D.C. 2009). 
 127. Id. at 35. 
 128. Al Ginco v. Obama, 626 F. Supp. 2d 123, 128 (D.D.C. 2009). 
 129. Id.  
 130. Id. at 124 (noting that the petitioner preferred the surname Janko). 
 131. Id. at 129; see also id. at 128 (noting that the government’s position 
“defies common sense”). 
 132. See id. at 130.  
 133. It is notable that this limit was imposed by Judge Leon, who, in a pre-
vious case and in Al Ginco, adopted wholesale the Bush Defense Department’s 
definition of enemy combatant. Id. at 126–27 (adopting the same definition of 
enemy combatant as in Boumediene III, 583 F. Supp. 2d 133, 134–35 (D.D.C. 
2008)). Indeed, in Al Ginco, Judge Leon was seemingly baffled by the Obama 
Administration’s abandonment of the “enemy combatant” label and decision to 
“go so far as to advocate that the Court adopt an even higher standard” as to 
the support component of the definition. See Al Ginco, 626 F. Supp. 2d at 127. 
Other judges have also recognized that detainees may sever their membership 
through extreme time lapse or affirmative acts of disassociation. Khalifh v. 
Obama, No. 05-CV-1189, 2010 WL 2382925, at *2 (D.D.C. May 28, 2010) 
(Judge Robertson); Hatim v. Obama, 677 F. Supp. 2d 1, 12 (D.D.C. 2009) (Judge 
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Several judges, however, refused to read Hamdi as chan-
neling the judicial inquiry toward an assessment of detainee 
dangerousness. Finding the case against petitioner Ali Awad to 
be “gossamer thin,”134 and noting that “[i]t seems ludicrous to 
believe that he poses a security threat now,” Judge Robertson 
nonetheless denied Awad’s petition, reasoning that his dange-
rousness “is not for me to decide.”135 In so holding, Judge Rob-
ertson expressly declined to adopt Judge Huvelle’s approach of 
making a more individualized judgment of dangerousness.136 It 
seems inescapable, therefore, that—all else being equal—had 
Ali Awad appeared before Judge Huvelle instead of Judge Rob-
ertson, his petition would have been granted.137 
Each of these approaches is defensible. Judge Huvelle’s 
conclusion that a terrorist-cum-U.S. informant is unlikely to 
rejoin the terrorist organization is eminently reasonable. And 
judges routinely assess detainee dangerousness for the purpose 
of pretrial detention in the criminal context.138 But Judge Rob-
ertson’s conclusion that judges are not equipped to make these 
assessments where national security concerns are implicated is 
 
Urbina). That Judge Robertson—who refused to formally assess detainee dan-
gerousness in Awad v. Obama, 646 F. Supp. 2d 20, 24 (D.D.C. 2009)—has also 
taken this view suggests that the judges themselves may not see the member-
ship abandonment inquiry as being animated by dangerousness concerns. 
 134. Awad, 646 F. Supp. 2d at 27.  
 135. Id. at 24; see also id. at 27 (concluding reluctantly—after noting that 
“[t]he evidence is of a kind fit only for these unique proceedings [redacted] and 
has very little weight”—that it appears more likely than not that Awad was 
“for some period of time” part of al Qaeda and hence detainable), aff’d, 608 
F.3d 1 (D.C. Cir. 2010). 
 136. Id. at 24 (acknowledging “the power of Judge Huvelle’s argument” in 
Basardh, but stating without analysis “I decline to follow it in this case”). 
Judges Lamberth and Hogan also took this view. Naji al Warafi v. Obama, No. 
09 Civ. 2368, 2010 WL 1404001, at *11 (D.D.C. Mar. 24, 2010) (Judge Lam-
berth) (denying habeas petition, but doubting that the petitioner poses a 
threat to U.S. security and “hop[ing] that this Memorandum does not foreclose 
the government from continuing to review petitioner’s file”); Anam v. Obama, 
696 F. Supp. 2d 1, 4 (D.D.C. 2010) (Judge Hogan). 
 137. This prediction, of course, assumes that Judge Huvelle would have 
agreed with Judge Robertson’s assessment of Ali Awad’s dangerousness. It 
would be too speculative to make a similar prediction about Judge Leon be-
cause he has not expressly opined as to Hamdi’s emphasis on the prevention of 
future attacks. 
 138. See, e.g., Jeffrey Fagan & Martin Guggenheim, Preventive Detention 
and the Judicial Prediction of Dangerousness for Juveniles: A Natural Exper-
iment, 86 J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 415, 419–20 (1996) (discussing typical 
judicial considerations). 
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at least as sensible.139 Neither approach is compelled by Bou-
mediene, Hamdi, or the AUMF.  
One may reasonably have concluded that this paradox illu-
strates the inadequacy of the legal foundation for executive de-
tention and thus militates in favor of further congressional 
guidance. Yet again the D.C. Circuit has appropriately resolved 
the issue, holding that detainee dangerousness “is not at issue 
in [these] habeas corpus proceedings.”140 This result is a clear 
loss for detainees, and unquestionably good for the govern-
ment.141 Indeed, by endorsing the detention of an individual in 
whom it is “ludicrous” to perceive a security threat, this ap-
proach is, if anything, overly protective of national security 
prerogatives at the expense of detainee liberty interests. But 
like the court’s holding as to “substantial support,” whatever 
else might be said of the ruling, it is difficult to suggest that 
Congress could craft a standard more protective of national se-
curity. The next section argues that initial divergences among 
judges along the procedural axis have given rise to similarly 
pro-government rulings from the D.C. Circuit. And again, the 
result is a jurisprudence that is, if anything, overly protective 
of national security concerns at the expense of detainees. 
B. THE PROCEDURAL AXIS: ALLEVIATING THE “UNCOMMON 
POTENTIAL TO BURDEN THE EXECUTIVE” 
Just as district court judges disagreed about the substan-
tive scope of executive detention authority under the AUMF, a 
number of important divergences along the procedural axis 
 
 139. See Boumediene I, 553 U.S. 723, 797 (2008) (“[N]either the Members of 
this Court nor most federal judges begin the day with briefings that may de-
scribe new and serious threats to our Nation and its people.”). 
 140. Awad v. Obama, 608 F.3d 1, 11 (D.C. Cir. 2010) (citing Al-Bihani v. 
Obama, 590 F.3d 866, 874 (D.C. Cir. 2010)). It is worth noting that the door 
remains ajar for judges to make sub silentio dangerousness assessments by 
finding that a petitioner has severed his membership in the proscribed group. 
 141. True, one might argue that prohibiting such assessments may be 
beneficial for detainees in that there is no principled reason under a danger-
ousness-responsive approach that would preclude a judge from considering 
dangerousness to deny an otherwise meritorious habeas petition. That is, in 
the absence of clear standards, if substantive detention authority were linked 
to detainee dangerousness “[e]ven the judges who strive conscientiously to ap-
ply the law [would] have little choice but to assess . . . dangerousness on the 
basis of whatever standards they deem appropriate,” Schall v. Martin, 467 
U.S. 253, 308 (1984) (Marshall, J., dissenting), a result difficult to square with 
basic notions of fairness. Still, at the time of the D.C. Circuit’s opinion, district 
court judges had only considered detainee dangerousness as a mitigating, ra-
ther than an aggravating, factor. 
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emerged early in the habeas litigation. Again, one can usefully 
understand these differences through the prism of deference; in 
short, some judges are more deferential to the government than 
others. On the one hand, it is difficult (if not impossible) to 
draw clear conclusions as to the district courts’ general level of 
deference to the government. While judges have taken steps to 
accommodate the government as contemplated in Hamdi and 
Boumediene,142 they have also pushed back against attempts to 
erode the core procedural guarantees conferred by Boume-
diene.143 On the other hand, it is clear that varying degrees of 
deference to the government gave rise to a fragmentation of 
procedural standards. Among other areas, judges disagreed 
about evidentiary issues and the procedural framework govern-
ing petitions. This section assesses these issues in turn, and 
demonstrates how D.C. Circuit rulings have narrowed these 
disagreements. 
1. Evidentiary Divisions 
At least two important disagreements have arisen about 
when and how courts should weigh the government’s evidence. 
First, judges have disagreed about when determinations as to 
the admissibility of evidence should be made. Some judges con-
sider all the evidence and then decide what to exclude at the 
end of the merits hearing.144 The rationale behind this ap-
proach is that the relevance of any given piece of evidence may 
only become clear after other evidence provides the requisite 
context.145 Other judges reject this approach and decide what to 
exclude when each piece of evidence is presented at a prelimi-
 
 142. For example, the courts have denied expansive discovery requests 
from detainees urging a broad reading of the CMO provision requiring disclo-
sure of “all reasonably available evidence.” Al-Adahi v. Obama, 597 F. Supp. 
2d 38, 41 (D.D.C. 2009) (quoting CMO, No. 08-0442, 2008 WL 4858241, at *1 
(D.D.C. Nov. 6, 2008)). At least one judge has allowed the government to sub-
mit ex parte information over petitioners’ objections. Al Odah v. United States, 
608 F. Supp. 2d 42, 45 n.3 (D.D.C. 2009) (justifying the apparent departure 
from precedent on the ground that “proceedings involving detainees such as 
Petitioners are unprecedented”). 
 143. E.g., Zaid v. Bush, 596 F. Supp. 2d 11, 12 (D.D.C. 2009) (rejecting the 
government’s claim that practical difficulties of producing certain evidence are 
so great as to endanger national security in light of Boumediene’s mandate to 
provide “prompt[ ]” and “meaningful” review).  
 144. Al Mutairi v. United States, 644 F. Supp. 2d 78, 84 (D.D.C. 2009) 
(Judge Kollar-Kotelly). 
 145. Id. 
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nary hearing.146 Indeed, one judge has criticized the former ap-
proach as “a direct inversion of what takes place in any other 
kind of adjudicative process, where factual findings are made 
on the basis of admissible evidence, not the other way 
around.”147  
If the goal of the habeas hearing is to get at the truth of the 
detainee’s status and hence the lawfulness of his detention—to 
“cut through all forms and go to the very tissue” of the mat-
ter148—it is difficult to credit the idea that judges must make 
piecemeal admissibility determinations. Such rigid adherence 
to procedure would all but ensure that relevant information is 
lost, particularly in light of the atypical evidence collection that 
characterizes many of the detainee cases.149 While it may be 
true that an ex post approach to admissibility determinations is 
a “direct inversion” of standard operating procedure in a jury 
trial, the Supreme Court has repeatedly underscored the novel-
ty of the Guantánamo habeas proceedings, and the correspond-
ing need to tailor procedures accordingly.150  
Similarly, judges have disagreed about how a habeas court 
is to approach the weighing of evidence. Much of the evidence 
in the habeas cases was not collected with a view to its use in 
future court proceedings.151 Accordingly, the government’s case 
is sometimes a patchwork or “mosaic” of allegations, which, 
when taken together, are claimed to show that the detainee 
satisfies either the “part of” or “support” standards.152 At least 
one judge has rejected this “mosaic theory.”153 Yet an approach 
 
 146. Bostan v. Obama, 662 F. Supp. 2d 1, 8 (D.D.C. 2009) (Judge Walton). 
 147. Id. at 7–8 (citation omitted). 
 148. Boumediene I, 553 U.S. 723, 785 (2008) (citation and quotation marks 
omitted). 
 149. See, e.g., Ali Ahmed v. Obama, 613 F. Supp. 2d 51, 55–56 (D.D.C. 
2009) (“One consequence of using intelligence reports and summaries [as evi-
dence] . . . is that certain questions simply cannot be answered . . . . Sizeable 
gaps may appear in the record and may well remain unfilled . . . .”); see also 
Chesney & Goldsmith, supra note 13, at 1088 (explaining that the procedural 
and evidentiary standards in the military detention context are generally less 
demanding in part because “[s]oldiers on the battlefield are not law enforcement 
officers and in most instances lack the time, resources, or training to collect 
evidence with an eye toward eventual use in court proceedings”). 
 150. Boumediene I, 553 U.S. at 795–96; Hamdi v. Rumsfeld, 542 U.S. 507, 
533–34 (2004) (plurality opinion). 
 151. See, e.g., Ali Ahmed, 613 F. Supp. 2d at 55–56; Chesney & Goldsmith, 
supra note 13, at 1088. 
 152. Ali Ahmed, 613 F. Supp. 2d at 55–56. 
 153. Id. at 55–56 (Judge Kessler) (“The kind and amount of evidence which 
satisfies the intelligence community . . . certainly cannot govern the Court’s rul-
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to admissibility that first considers all the evidence against a 
detainee and then decides what is admissible is the functional 
equivalent of such an approach.154 While there are arguments 
to commend each method, there is little to commend a system 
that applies both standards unequally among detainees. 
But the application of divergent standards is much less 
likely following the D.C. Circuit’s opinion in Al-Adahi v. Oba-
ma.155 In that case, holding that the district court “clearly erred 
in its treatment of the evidence and in its view of the law,” the 
panel reversed Judge Kessler’s grant of Al-Adahi’s habeas peti-
tion with instructions for denial on remand.156 The district 
court’s analysis was “infected” by the “fundamental mistake” of 
considering each piece of evidence in isolation, rather than as 
part of a larger puzzle.157 More specifically, the lower court er-
roneously reasoned that “if a particular fact does not itself 
prove the ultimate proposition (e.g., whether the detainee was 
part of al-Qaida), the fact may be tossed aside and the next fact 
may be evaluated as if the first did not exist.”158 This approach 
led the court to the “manifestly incorrect—indeed startling—
conclusion that ‘there is no reliable evidence in the record that 
Petitioner was a member of al-Qaida.’”159  
While the court did not directly address the timing of ad-
missibility determinations or explicitly reference the “mosaic 
theory,” its discussion is plainly relevant to these issues. The 
panel’s holding suggests, in short, that judges are to consider 
each piece of evidence in the broader context of the govern-
ment’s case against the detainee. Similarly, the D.C. Circuit 
has also recognized “the reality that district judges are expe-
rienced and sophisticated fact finders” whose “eyes need not be 
protected from unreliable information in the manner the Fed-
eral Rules of Evidence aim to shield the eyes of impressionable 
 
ing.”); see also, e.g., Boumediene II, 579 F. Supp. 2d 191, 197 (D.D.C. 2008). 
 154. Cf., e.g., Al Mutairi v. United States, 644 F. Supp. 2d 78, 84 (D.D.C. 
2009) (making admissibility determinations after considering all the evidence 
“in . . . context”). 
 155. 612 F.3d 1102 (D.C. Cir. 2010). 
 156. Id. at 1111. 
 157. Id. at 1105–06 (internal quotation marks and citation omitted). 
 158. Id. at 1105 (citation omitted). 
 159. Id. at 1106. The court explained these errors in terms of a failure to 
appreciate conditional probability analysis, the key insight of which is that the 
occurrence of some events may make the occurrence of other events more or 
less likely. Id. at 1105. 
  
2010] HABEAS AT GUANTÁNAMO BAY 271 
 
juries.”160 These statements provide much needed guidance to 
the district courts. Moreover, to the extent the D.C. Circuit has 
erred, it has done so in favor of detention rather than erroneous 
release. Both of these points undermine any national security 
incentive that Congress might have to provide further guidance 
to the courts in the form of new detention legislation. 
2. Framework Divisions 
One may also worry that procedural differences among 
judges might lead to different results for similarly situated de-
tainees. As contemplated in Judge Hogan’s CMO, judges can 
tailor the procedural framework to fit their cases.161 Many such 
alterations are modest and unlikely to lead to variation in 
substantive outcomes.162 Some differences, however, are more 
substantial and may, in theory, lead to the imposition of a more 
onerous burden on the government in some cases than in oth-
ers. Judge Kessler, for example, is unwilling to consider accord-
ing the government’s evidence a rebuttable presumption of ac-
curacy,163 whereas other judges have not formally foreclosed 
this option.164 It is difficult to determine whether such frame-
 
 160. Al-Bihani v. Obama, 590 F.3d 866, 880 (D.C. Cir. 2010). 
 161. CMO, No. 08-0442, 2008 WL 4858241, at *1 (D.D.C. Nov. 6, 2008). 
This approach is in line with the Supreme Court’s directive. See Boumediene I, 
553 U.S. 723, 788–89 (2008) (leaving it to the district courts to craft appropri-
ate procedures). 
 162. Compare Boumediene I, 553 U.S. at 788–89 (2008) (requiring the gov-
ernment to file “a succinct statement explaining its legal justification for de-
taining the petitioner”), with Al-Adahi v. Bush, 585 F. Supp. 2d 78, 79 (D.D.C. 
2008) (requiring the government to file “a succinct (one or two paragraph) 
statement explaining the specific legal grounds upon which it relies for detain-
ing each Petitioner”). 
 163. See Al-Adahi, 585 F. Supp. 2d at 81. Moreover, whereas the CMO re-
quires the government to provide petitioner with “all reasonably available [ex-
culpatory] evidence in its possession,” CMO, 2008 WL 4858241, at *1, Judge 
Kessler requires the government to provide “all reasonably available [exculpa-
tory] evidence in its possession or that the Government can obtain through rea-
sonable diligence,” Al-Adahi, 585 F. Supp. 2d at 79 (emphasis added). Judge 
Kessler has also elaborated beyond the CMO that “[t]he Government bears a 
continuing obligation to update and supplement” the exculpatory evidence it 
presents to the detainee. Id. at 80.  
 164. See Boumediene I, 553 U.S. 723, 788–90 (2008) (leaving it to the dis-
trict courts to craft appropriate procedures); Hamdi v. Rumsfeld, 542 U.S. 507, 
534 (2004) (plurality opinion) (stating that a rebuttable presumption “in favor 
of the Government’s evidence” might be permissible but is not mandatory). In 
practice, however, district court judges have denied nearly all government re-
quests for a presumption of accuracy. E.g., Al-Adahi v. Obama, No. 05-280, 
2009 WL 2584685, at *4 (D.D.C. Aug. 21, 2009) (“[T]he Court must . . . make 
the final judgment as to the reliability of these documents, the weight to be 
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work divisions lead to unfairness for either the government or 
detainees in part because much depends on how stringently 
judges enforce these standards. Critically, however, the D.C. 
Circuit has approved wide discretion for district court judges as 
to procedural matters.165 Indeed, “appropriate habeas proce-
dures cannot be conceived of as mere extensions of an existing 
doctrine. Rather, those procedures are a whole new branch of 
the tree.”166 This result is as it should be. District court judges 
are well-suited to craft procedures that accommodate the gov-
ernment’s national security interests, while ensuring accurate 
fact-finding and hence a fair hearing for detainees.167 It would 
be unwise to mandate more rigid procedures for this “unprece-
dented” process. While some variations between judges as to 
procedural matters will persist, it is far from clear that these 
differences are so great as to lead to differences in substantive 
outcomes. 
 
given to them, and their accuracy.”), rev’d on other grounds, Al-Adahi v. Oba-
ma, 613 F.3d 1102 (D.C. Cir. 2010). See generally HUMAN RIGHTS FIRST & THE 
CONSTITUTION PROJECT, HABEAS WORKS: FEDERAL COURTS’ PROVEN 
CAPACITY TO HANDLE GUANTÁNAMO CASES 21 (2010) [hereinafter HABEAS 
WORKS], available at http://www.humanrightsfirst.org/pdf/Habeas-Works-final 
-web.pdf. By contrast, judges have been much more likely to accord the gov-
ernment’s evidence a rebuttable presumption of authenticity. E.g., Ahmed v. 
Obama, 613 F. Supp. 2d 51, 54–55 (D.D.C. 2009). See generally Al-Adahi, 2009 
WL 2584685, at *3; HABEAS WORKS, supra, at 22. Hamdi offers little guidance 
on the point. Hamdi v. Rumsfeld, 542 U.S. 507, 534 (2004) (plurality opinion) 
(stating that a rebuttable presumption “in favor of the Government’s evidence” 
might be permissible but is not mandatory). 
 165. See, e.g., Al-Bihani v. Obama, 590 F.3d 866, 877 (D.C. Cir. 2010) (“[I]n 
the shadow of Boumediene, courts are neither bound by the procedural limits 
created for other detention contexts nor obliged to use them as baselines from 
which any departures must be justified.”); see also Al-Adahi, 613 F.3d at 1111 
n.6 (declining to recognize the district court’s separate ruling on each item of 
hearsay as an abuse of discretion); Bensayah v. Obama, 610 F.3d 718, 724 
(D.C. Cir. 2010) (declining to find that the district court abused its discretion 
and citing Boumediene’s recognition of the district court’s discretion to protect 
sources and intelligence gathering methods). 
 166. Al-Bihani, 590 F.3d at 877. 
 167. See Boumediene I, 553 U.S. at 796 (noting that such questions are 
within the “expertise and competence” of the district courts); Hamdi, 542 U.S. 
at 539 (anticipating that district courts will proceed with caution and “pay 
proper heed both to the matters of national security that might arise . . . and 
to the constitutional limitations safeguarding essential liberties”). 
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III.  HABEAS WORKS: THE PRAGMATIC CASE AGAINST 
NEW DETENTION LEGISLATION   
In September 2009, President Obama declined to seek new 
detention legislation.168 One may have doubted the wisdom of 
this decision in the early months of the habeas litigation. Per-
haps an inevitable consequence of Boumediene,169 the vague-
ness of the legal authority on which the government rests its 
ability to detain suspected terrorists initially gave rise to a 
deeply fractured jurisprudence in the district courts.170 This 
state of affairs led some commentators, including judges and 
legislators, to call for Congress to intervene to provide guidance 
for the courts.171 As an abstract policy matter, it may well be 
preferable to build detention standards from the top down, 
through legislation or administrative regulations, rather than 
from the ground up, through the common-law process man-
dated by Boumediene. Part II took this argument seriously, and 
showed that the first eighteen months of habeas litigation were 
indeed plagued by substantive and procedural divergences 
among judges that arguably threatened equal application of the 
law and, possibly, national security prerogatives. But time has 
vindicated President Obama’s decision. Part II also showed 
that the D.C. Circuit has resolved the most salient of these di-
vergences in less than seven months, and in a manner that al-
most uniformly favors the government and thus undermines 
the key motivation for congressional action. In short, further 
 
 168. E.g., Peter Baker, Obama Says Current Law Will Support Detentions, 
N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 24, 2009, at A23, available at 2009 WL 18790454. 
 169. Chief Justice Roberts all but predicted as much in his dissent. See 
Boumediene I, 553 U.S. at 801–03 (Roberts, C.J., dissenting) (bemoaning the 
majority’s preference for a “set of shapeless procedures to be defined by federal 
courts at some future date” over a “review system designed by the people’s 
representatives”). 
 170. See supra Part II.A–B (describing both substantive and procedural di-
vergences among judges). 
 171. See Wittes & Goldsmith, Will Obama Follow Bush or FDR?, supra 
note 15; Goldsmith, supra note 13. The argument for detention legislation, of 
course, is not uniquely responsive to Boumediene. See, e.g., WITTES, supra note 
77, at 131–50. And yet the decision did seem to heighten the urgency of some 
calls for congressional action. Draft “war on terror” detention legislation, for 
example, became more prevalent. See BENJAMIN WITTES & COLLEEN A. 
PEPPARD, BROOKINGS INST., DESIGNING DETENTION: A MODEL LAW FOR 
TERRORIST INCAPACITATION 3–4 (2009), available at http://www.brookings 
.edu/papers/2009/0626_detention_wittes.aspx; Madeline Morris et al., After 
Guantanamo: War, Crime, and Detention, HARV. L. & POL’Y REV. ONLINE (Ju-
ly 14, 2009), http://www.hlpronline.com/Morris_HLPR_071409.pdf (appending 
draft of proposed legislation). 
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detention legislation is unnecessary because habeas works. The 
goal of this Part is to catalogue why new legislation is unneces-
sary, unwise, and indeed, unlikely. It argues that the most 
prudent course is also the most politically palatable: to allow 
the habeas litigation to continue to unfold. 
A. NEW LEGISLATION IS NOT SUBSTANTIVELY NECESSARY 
The problems with pressing for new detention legislation 
can be distilled to issues of necessity, motivation, and compe-
tence. Building on the above description of the habeas litiga-
tion, this section tackles the first of these issues and argues 
that further legislation is unnecessary to bolster either of the 
two primary issues at stake in the habeas litigation—national 
security and detainee welfare. 
Many have urged further detention legislation, including 
D.C. judges presiding over the habeas litigation. Thomas Ho-
gan, Chief Judge of the D.C. district courts and the author of 
the procedural order that governs the Guantánamo litigation, 
urged congressional action by highlighting the uniformity is-
sues discussed above. “It is unfortunate,” said Judge Hogan, 
“that the Legislative Branch of our government, and the Execu-
tive Branch have not moved more strongly to provide uniform, 
clear rules and laws for handling these cases.”172 The differenc-
es among judges point to the “need for a national legislative so-
lution with the assistance of the Executive so that these mat-
ters are handled promptly and uniformly and fairly for all 
concerned.”173 Similarly, Judge Janice Rogers Brown of the 
D.C. Circuit suggested that a “court-driven process” is not best 
suited to “protect[] both the rights of petitioners and the safety 
of our nation.”174 Rather, “the circumstances that frustrate the 
judicial process are the same ones that make this situation par-
ticularly ripe for Congress to intervene pursuant to its policy 
expertise, democratic legitimacy, and oath to uphold and de-
fend the Constitution.”175 In short, “[w]ar is a challenge to law, 
and the law must adjust.”176 
 
 172. See HABEAS LAWMAKING, supra note 15, at 252 (quoting Transcript of 
Hearing at 7, Anam v. Obama, 696 F. Supp. 2d 1 (D.D.C. 2009) (No. 04-1194)). 
 173. See id. 
 174. Al-Bihani v. Obama, 590 F.3d 866, 881 (D.C. Cir. 2010) (Brown, J., 
concurring). 
 175. Id. at 882.  
 176. Id. 
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Perhaps. And yet this Note has demonstrated that over the 
last two years, the law has done precisely that: adjust to meet 
the challenges of the Guantánamo litigation. Divergences 
among district court judges have narrowed as the jurispru-
dence has matured, and the D.C. Circuit has resolved most is-
sues in favor of the government. Still, Judge Brown rightly 
points to the twin reasons that might conceivably animate fur-
ther detention legislation: national security and detainee wel-
fare. Neither presents a convincing rationale for congressional 
action. 
First, the notion that Congress would better protect detain-
ee welfare is simply not credible. The only lobbies concerned 
with detainee welfare—human rights and civil liberties 
groups—have long opposed further detention legislation be-
cause, they reason, it would further entrench an illegitimate 
system of detention.177 But even assuming the legitimacy of 
 
 177. E.g., Press Release, ACLU, Obama Administration Will Not Seek In-
definite Detention Legislation (Sept. 24, 2009), available at http://www.aclu 
.org/national-security/obama-administration-will-not-seek-indefinite-detention 
-legislation. As a practical matter, however, given the logic of Hamdi (the 
President can detain some suspected terrorists) and Boumediene (some of 
them can challenge their detention in federal court), it is too late in the day to 
debate the merits of creating such a system. See Goldsmith, supra note 13, at 
2 (arguing that the national security court debate “is largely a canard”).  
It is worth pausing to consider the alternative to habeas that many such 
groups put forward—the trial of all remaining Guantánamo detainees (and all 
future terrorism suspects) in federal criminal court. Id. This position is deeply 
misguided. While the Guantánamo litigation demonstrates that the courts are, 
indeed, capable of fashioning flexible remedies to protect core government in-
terests, it also shows that the government’s ability to detain even the most 
dangerous of suspects can be sharply circumscribed by evidentiary defects. 
See, e.g., Bostan v. Obama, 662 F. Supp. 2d 1, 5 (D.D.C. 2009) (stating that the 
habeas petition will proceed even if the government’s only evidence against 
petitioner is found to be inadmissible hearsay); Ahmed v. Obama, 613 F. Supp. 
2d 51, 56 (D.D.C. 2009) (“The kind and amount of evidence which satisfies the 
intelligence community . . . certainly cannot govern the Court’s ruling.”). The 
burden on the government is even higher in the criminal context, where 
judges hew more rigorously to the rules of evidence and the government must 
prove its case “beyond a reasonable doubt,” rather than by a preponderance of 
the evidence. See Chesney & Goldsmith, supra note 13, at 1087–88. Indeed, 
mandating that all suspected terrorists face trial in federal court would un-
dercut the government’s incentives to pursue legal remedies and would create 
perverse incentives, including making more attractive the option of killing 
suspected terrorists rather than risk a loss in federal court. E.g., Capture or 
Kill? Lawyers Eye Options For Terrorists (NPR radio broadcast Oct. 8, 2009), 
available at http://www.npr.org/templates/story/story.php?storyId=113612058 
(“Many national security experts interviewed for this story agree that it has 
become so hard for the U.S. to detain people that in many instances, the U.S. 
government is killing them instead.”). Having apparently internalized this 
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some form of executive detention, it would be naïve to suggest 
that the political branches mobilize for the benefit of Guantá-
namo detainees. To the extent members of Congress are incen-
tivized to be “tough on terrorism,”178 one cannot reasonably ex-
pect detention reform to enhance fairness to detainees. Indeed, 
the jurisdiction-stripping legislation struck down by Boume-
diene demonstrates that most members of Congress object to 
detainees’ access to the court system in the first instance.179 
True, even among opponents of further legislation, there are 
few vocal advocates of the current state of affairs.180 From a 
pragmatic detainee-welfare perspective, however, as between 
new legislation and the current process of habeas review, the 
current process is the lesser of two evils.181  
Although one cannot credibly urge congressional action to 
protect detainee rights, one may do so for national security rea-
sons. An argument that the fractious lower court jurisprudence 
is in part the result of judges whittling away at the President’s 
detention authority may well have political bite.182 The nation-
al security argument for further detention legislation is, in 
short, that the President’s continued ability to detain danger-
ous individuals depends on clearer standards from Congress. 
One might further bolster this argument by noting that there is 
more at stake than detainee liberty. The rules federal judges 
are crafting will affect more than detention at Guantánamo; 
indeed, they are likely to influence military policymaking for 
years to come.183 The political branches have every incentive 
 
message, President Obama has increased the use of targeted killing far 
beyond its use in the Bush years. Shane Harris, Are Drone Strikes Murder?, 
NAT’L J., Jan. 9, 2010, at 23. 
 178. E.g., Jack M. Balkin & Sanford Levinson, The Process of Constitution-
al Change: From Partisan Entrenchment to the National Surveillance State, 75 
FORDHAM L. REV. 489, 530–31 (2006). 
 179. See supra note 40 and accompanying text. 
 180. See, e.g., Deborah Pearlstein, Catching Up With the Critics, OPINIO 
JURIS (Oct. 3, 2009, 10:06 AM), http://opiniojuris.org/2009/10/03/catching-up 
-with-the-critics/. A recent report by Human Rights First and The Constitution 
Project is a notable exception. See HABEAS WORKS, supra note 164, at 27–28. 
 181. One might challenge this statement in view of some panel opinions 
that can fairly be described as hostile to detainees. E.g., Al-Adahi v. Obama, 
613 F.3d 1102, 1111 (D.C. Cir. 2010) (criticizing the district court for “dis-
play[ing] little skepticism about [petitioner’s] explanations for his actions”). 
Still, it is difficult to imagine that, all things considered, Congress would be 
more protective of detainee rights. 
 182. Cf. Balkin & Levinson, supra note 178, at 530–31. 
 183. See, e.g., Al-Bihani v. Obama, 590 F.3d 866, 877 (D.C. Cir. 2010); Mat-
thew C. Waxman, Guantánamo, Habeas Corpus, and Standards of Proof: 
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the argument goes to ensure that the habeas litigation does not 
impinge on the military’s ability to prosecute the “war on ter-
ror” by targeting and detaining dangerous individuals. 
But these security-oriented arguments ring hollow in the 
face of the overwhelmingly pro-government jurisprudence 
emerging from the D.C. Circuit. In the dim light cast by Bou-
mediene and Hamdi, the D.C. Circuit has suggested that the 
vague mandate of the AUMF establishes, for example, that a 
petitioner’s presence at an al Qaeda guesthouse is (almost cer-
tainly) independently sufficient to justify detention.184 One 
panel intimated that district court judges should be particular-
ly skeptical of detainees’ evidence.185 Moreover, the court has 
vigorously questioned the necessity of the preponderance 
standard—uniformly adopted by district court judges and ac-
cepted by the Obama Administration—and all but invited the 
government to press for the lower “some evidence” standard, 
which has not been seriously advanced since the Bush Admin-
istration.186 The D.C. Circuit has also translated the nonbind-
ing suggestion from four members of the Hamdi plurality that 
hearsay “may need to be accepted as the most reliable available 
evidence from the Government”187 into the repeated holding 
that “hearsay . . . is always admissible.”188 And the court disap-
 
Viewing the Law Through Multiple Lenses, 42 CASE W. RES. J. INT’L L. 245, 
263–65 (2009); Savage, supra note 81. 
 184. See Al-Adahi, 613 F.3d at 1108 (“Al-Adahi’s voluntary decision to 
move to an al-Qaida guesthouse, a staging area for recruits heading for a mili-
tary training camp, makes it more likely—indeed, very likely—that Al-Adahi 
was himself a recruit. There is no other sensible explanation for his actions. 
This is why we wrote in Al-Bihani that an individual’s attendance at an al-
Qaida guesthouse is powerful—indeed ‘overwhelming[ ]’—evidence that the 
individual was part of al-Qaida.” (quoting Al-Bihani, 590 F.3d at 873 n.2)). 
 185. See id. at 1111 (criticizing the district court for “display[ing] little 
skepticism about [petitioner’s] explanations for his actions”). 
 186. See id. at 1104–05. This point stands as a counterargument to the the-
sis advanced here. Specifically, while the primary role of the D.C. Circuit has 
been to resolve disagreements among lower court judges, the court has also in-
jected some uncertainty into the process. A formal acceptance of the “some evi-
dence” standard would be very destabilizing to the Guantánamo jurisprudence.  
 187. Hamdi v. Rumsfeld, 542 U.S. 507, 533–34 (2004) (plurality opinion). 
Justice Souter explicitly disclaimed his assent on these points. Id. at 553–54 
(Souter, J., concurring in part, dissenting in part, and concurring in the judg-
ment) (“I do not mean to imply agreement that the government could claim an 
evidentiary presumption casting the burden of rebuttal on Hamdi . . . or that 
an opportunity to litigate before a military tribunal might obviate or truncate 
enquiry by a court on habeas.”). 
 188. Al-Bihani, 590 F.3d at 879. Although Al-Bihani was the first instance 
in which the D.C. Circuit made this leap from Hamdi’s observation, it has fre-
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proves of judicial assessments of detainee dangerousness, even 
when this approach would lead to the continued detention of an 
individual in whom it is “ludicrous” to perceive a security 
threat.189 In sum, it is difficult to characterize the D.C. Circuit 
case law as giving rise to serious national security concerns.  
B. MOTIVATION AND COMPETENCE 
Apart from the point that new legislation is not substan-
tively necessary, perhaps the most obvious—if unremarkable—
argument against further detention legislation is that it is un-
likely. Passing detention legislation would require President 
Obama to expend political capital at a time when other issues 
dominate the national agenda, something the President is no 
doubt even more reluctant to do now than when he first de-
clined to do so in September 2009.190 The same is true of most 
legislators; it is well recognized that politicians “have a strong 
incentive to avoid taking up a question that has been provision-
ally settled by a court.”191 In short, even assuming new legisla-
tion to be the ideal course of action, it is far from clear that 
Congress could actually pass it. And most legislators may not 
even be tempted to try given Congress’s ill-fated history in this 
area.192  
Still, one might argue that the courts are not institutional-
ly competent to resolve the policy questions embedded in refin-
ing the vague detention criteria of the AUMF.193 The habeas lit-
 
quently relied on this holding. E.g., Al Odah v. United States, 611 F.3d 8, 14 
(D.C. Cir. 2010); Awad v. Obama, 608 F.3d 1, 7 (D.C. Cir. 2010). 
 189. See Awad, 608 F.3d at 11 (citing Al-Bihani, 590 F.3d at 874). 
 190. See, e.g., Baker, supra note 168 (“Given the opposition in Congress to 
Mr. Obama’s plan to close Guantánamo, especially if it means transferring de-
tainees to prisons on American soil, the prospect of writing legislation that 
would pass both houses appears daunting at best.”). That Lindsey Graham’s 
negotiations with the White House over detention issues have been unproduc-
tive seems to confirm the President’s lack of interest. See Gerstein, supra note 15. 
 191. Jane S. Schacter, Metademocracy: The Changing Structure of Legiti-
macy in Statutory Interpretation, 108 HARV. L. REV. 593, 605 (1995). 
 192. Senator Lindsey Graham is an important exception. Ben Wittes, an 
early advocate of new detention legislation and drafter of an August 2010 ha-
beas reform bill introduced by Lindsey Graham, has called the Senator “the 
only voice for something that really should be a matter of political consensus.” 
Gerstein, supra note 15. As for the lack of institutional motivation, both Con-
gress and President Bush were repeatedly rebuffed by a rights-protective Su-
preme Court. See supra notes 32–42 and accompanying text. 
 193. Some insist that the courts are merely “interpreting and applying” 
substantive detention criteria, while others argue that the courts are making 
substantive law, and hence detention policy. Compare HABEAS WORKS, supra 
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igation has disproven this thesis. The animating concern here 
is, again, national security. While the courts have taken steps 
to protect detainee rights—and some district court judges have 
been more aggressive in this respect than others—the stand-
ards emerging from the D.C. Circuit do not protect detainee 
rights at the expense of national security concerns. Indeed, to 
the extent that court has erred, it has done so in favor of the 
government. For example, one panel went so far as to hint that 
district court judges should be particularly skeptical of detain-
ees’ explanations, given that al Qaeda members are trained “to 
make up a story and lie.”194 One might observe that such skep-
ticism would seem to put the cart before the horse by assuming 
detainees to be members of al Qaeda, whereas the whole point 
of a habeas proceeding is to determine whether each petitioner 
in fact meets that standard. Regardless, the limited point here 
is that the D.C. Circuit seems to favor resolving “close calls” in 
favor of the government. 
Furthermore, even if, from an abstracted institutional 
perspective, Congress is better suited to the task, there is good 
reason to doubt that Congress would, in fact, produce reasoned, 
sensible detention legislation. New legislation is likely to be 
less the result of reasonable deliberation and more a function of 
interest group politics.195 A habeas reform bill introduced by 
Lindsey Graham in early August 2010 illustrates this point.196 
The bill would require the D.C. district courts to give “utmost 
deference” to the executive’s determination as to whether a 
particular organization is associated with al Qaeda or the Tali-
 
note 164, at 27 (interpreting and applying), with HABEAS LAWMAKING, supra 
note 15 (lawmaking). At a minimum, Part II demonstrates that policy judg-
ments unquestionably animate at least some judges’ interpretation of deten-
tion standards—an observation that should be generally unremarkable. See 
RICHARD A. POSNER, HOW JUDGES THINK 47 (2008) (“Attitudinalists and legal-
ists disagree about the extent of political judging rather than about its exist-
ence.”). Still, putting aside any potential non-delegation issues, it is not inconsis-
tent to recognize the profound policy implications of the habeas litigation, and 
maintain that the courts are competent to adjudicate habeas petitions.  
 194. Al-Adahi v. Obama, 613 F.3d 1102, 1111 (D.C. Cir. 2010) (criticizing 
the district court for “display[ing] little skepticism about [petitioner’s] explana-
tions for his actions” and for failing to make any formal finding as to credibility). 
 195. This public choice insight has a robust scholarly pedigree. E.g., 
DANIEL A. FARBER & PHILIP P. FRICKEY, LAW AND PUBLIC CHOICE: A CRITICAL 
INTRODUCTION 12–25 (1991); Richard A. Posner, Statutory Interpretation—In 
the Classroom and in the Courtroom, 50 U. CHI. L. REV. 800, 819 (1983); see 
also Philip P. Frickey, From the Big Sleep to the Big Heat: The Revival of Theory 
in Statutory Interpretation, 77 MINN. L. REV. 241, 250 (1992) (collecting sources). 
 196. See Terrorist Detention Review Reform Act, S. 3707, 111th Cong. (2010). 
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ban.197 In essence, this provision would take from Congress its 
constitutional power to determine the entities with which the 
United States is at war.198 The criticism, then, is that even if 
institutionally competent, Congress may not be politically com-
petent to pass detention legislation that would be any more ef-
fective than the habeas litigation has proven to be.199 And, like 
the Graham bill, resulting legislation may well raise serious 
constitutional concerns, the resolution of which would only fur-
ther delay the habeas proceedings. In any case, new legislation 
would also be subject to interpretation by courts, and so—
rather than clarifying the law—may only destabilize the in-
creasingly coherent jurisprudence.200 
It bears emphasizing that the political branches could pass 
new detention legislation that appropriately reckoned with the 
implications of Boumediene, ensuring that detainees have a 
prompt, meaningful chance to contest their status, to assess the 
evidence against them, and so on.201 The suggestion here, how-
ever, is that the game would not be worth the candle: the fed-
eral courts in Washington, D.C. have already done this work for 
them. 
C. CONGRESSIONAL INACTION 
The best option is, in the end, the simplest one. The politi-
cal branches should allow the courts to continue to adjudicate 
habeas petitions on the basis of the AUMF as construed in 
Hamdi and in light of the Court’s guidance in Boumediene. As 
has happened over the last two years, remaining differences 
among judges will likely narrow over time as the jurisprudence 
matures.202 True, as Judge Brown pointed out in urging con-
 
 197. Id. § 2256(d)(2). 
 198. See U.S. CONST. art I, § 8. 
 199. Still, one might persist that the interest group argument tends to have 
less bite in the context of national security emergencies. See Harold Hongju 
Koh & John Choon Yoo, Dollar Diplomacy/Dollar Defense: The Fabric of Eco-
nomics and National Security Law, 26 INT’L LAW. 715, 761 (1992); see also 
Mario L. Barnes & F. Greg Bowman, Entering Unprecedented Terrain: Chart-
ing a Method to Reduce Madness in Post-9/11 Power and Rights Conflicts, 62 
U. MIAMI L. REV. 365, 382 (2008). But nearly ten years after 9/11 and after 
two years of habeas litigation, the unifying impetus to protect the nation from 
attack is likely to have given way to the traditional incentive of elected offi-
cials—reelection. Cf. id. 
 200. See, e.g., HABEAS WORKS, supra note 164, at 28. 
 201. See supra text accompanying notes 44–53. 
 202. See generally Peter L. Strauss, The Common Law and Statutes, 70 U. 
COLO. L. REV. 225, 240–41 (1999) (describing the common-law process). 
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gressional action, the common-law process depends on incre-
mentalism and eventual correction, and may be most effective 
where there are a significant number of cases brought before a 
large number of courts; by contrast, the number of Guantána-
mo detainees is limited, the circumstances of their confinement 
are unique, and all cases are heard before the D.C. courts.203 
Yet, as Part II demonstrated, even as district court judges have 
rejected the alternative approaches of their colleagues on both 
substantive and procedural issues,204 the common-law process 
has already worked to resolve many of these disagreements. 
And that all habeas cases are heard before the federal courts in 
Washington, D.C. is a virtue rather than a vice, as it allows the 
D.C. judges to rapidly accumulate expertise.205 
A central purpose of the habeas litigation is to allow each 
detainee a fair and equal chance to challenge his confinement. 
The early months of litigation gave reasons to doubt whether 
that was happening. But times have changed. Detainees need 
not wait for the law to cohere on some future date; it is already 
beginning to do so. While detainees do not benefit from all as-
pects of the jurisprudence emerging from the D.C. Circuit, the 
law is at least becoming coherent and consistent enough to pro-
vide every detainee the same, genuine opportunity to challenge 
his detention.  
The D.C. Circuit has not resolved every divergence, nor 
could it. Some disagreements, rooted in different conceptions of 
the appropriate amount of deference to accord the government 
in light of Boumediene, will persist.206 Given the convergence of 
 
 203. See Al-Bihani v. Obama, 590 F.3d 866, 881 (D.C. Cir. 2010) (Brown, J., 
concurring). 
 204. E.g., Bostan v. Obama, 662 F. Supp. 2d 1, 3 (D.D.C. 2009) (procedure); 
Awad v. Obama, 646 F. Supp. 2d 20, 23 (D.D.C. 2009) (substance). 
 205. See HABEAS WORKS, supra note 164, at 5. 
 206. Another critical issue, for example, is the government’s ability to pro-
tect sensitive information from public scrutiny for national security reasons. 
The district courts have ordered the disclosure of such information over the 
government’s objection in certain circumstances. See, e.g., In re Guantánamo 
Bay Detainee Litig., 634 F. Supp. 2d 17, 22–23 (D.D.C. 2009) (“No one is better 
positioned to challenge the government’s reliance on a petitioner’s statements 
than the petitioner himself.”); see also In re Guantánamo Bay Detainee Litig., 
624 F. Supp. 2d 27 (D.D.C. 2009) (denying a motion to seal all unclassified fac-
tual returns). Still another crucial—and in some cases dispositive—issue is the 
extent to which judges will rely on detainees’ statements thought to be 
“tainted” by improper interrogation methods. See Chisun Lee, Judges Reject 
Evidence in Gitmo Cases, NAT’L L.J., Aug. 16, 2010, http://www.law.com/jsp/ 
nlj/index.jsp (search “National Law Journal” for “Chisun Lee”; then follow 
“Judges reject evidence in Gitmo cases” hyperlink) (last visited Oct. 19, 2010). 
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substantive detention standards discussed above, such disa-
greements may increasingly be about procedural matters. From 
a uniformity standpoint this result is less of a problem. Proce-
dure is an area of unique judicial expertise; district court 
judges are well suited to develop procedures that ensure accu-
rate fact-finding and a fair—or at least reasoned and public—
resolution of each habeas case.207 It would be unwise to 
mandate a one-size-fits-all procedural framework for cases that 
are widely recognized to be “unique” and “unprecedented.”208  
  CONCLUSION   
The Guantánamo habeas cases have challenged our court 
system. With little guidance from Congress or the Supreme 
Court, federal judges have been muddling through the habeas 
cases for over two years. But while district court judges have 
disagreed about both substantive and procedural issues, the 
D.C. Circuit has resolved the most salient of these disagree-
ments. As a result, the habeas jurisprudence is increasingly co-
herent, and effectively provides each detainee with the same, 
meaningful chance to challenge his detention. Moreover, the 
many detainee wins have not come at the expense of laying 
precedent that threatens U.S. national security. Indeed, the 
standards emerging from the D.C. Circuit are, if anything, 
overly protective of national security prerogatives at the ex-
pense of detainee liberty. For detainees as well as for the gov-
ernment, then, habeas works.  
Many eight-or-more-year denizens of Guantánamo never 
belonged there, and the story of their detention will no doubt 
long stain the reputation of the United States as a champion of 
individual liberty and human rights. But the story recounted 
 
For a lengthier descriptive treatment of other procedural issues, see HABEAS 
LAWMAKING, supra note 15, at 32–64. 
 207. See Boumediene I, 553 U.S. 723, 730, 795–96 (2008); Hamdi v. Rums-
feld, 542 U.S. 507, 539 (2004) (plurality opinion). Indeed, the evidentiary 
standards emerging from the federal courts mirror one early proposal for legis-
lative reform. See Goldsmith, supra note 13, at 12 (urging evidentiary proce-
dures akin to those used in international criminal tribunals, which typically 
permit all relevant, probative, and reliable evidence). 
 208. See Awad v. Obama, 608 F.3d 1, 12 (D.C. Cir. 2010) (“Because of the 
unique nature of the conflict in which the United States is now involved, the 
Supreme Court has recognized that we may need to alter or amend our normal 
procedures . . . .”); Al Odah v. United States, 608 F. Supp. 2d 42, 45 & n.3 
(D.D.C. 2009) (justifying an apparent departure from precedent on the ground 
that “proceedings involving detainees such as Petitioners are unprecedented”); 
see also Boumediene I, 553 U.S. at 792–93; Hamdi, 542 U.S. at 533–34. 
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here is not an unmitigated failure of these principles. Boume-
diene gave detainees access to a process that has led many to 
freedom; Fouad Al-Rabiah, the aviation engineer discussed in 
the Introduction, is now at home in Kuwait.209 In sum, the ha-
beas cases decided so far suggest that the wisest course of ac-
tion is also the simplest and most politically attractive. Con-
gress should stand back and allow the habeas litigation to 
proceed. 
 
 209. See, e.g., The Guantánamo Docket: Fouad Mahmoud Al Rabiah, N.Y. 
TIMES, http://projects.nytimes.com/guantanamo/detainees/551-fouad-mahoud 
-hasan-al-rabia (last visited Oct. 19, 2010). Of course, Al Rabiah’s release 
should not obscure the fact that he lost eight years of his life in Guantánamo 
Bay, Cuba. 
